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INTRODUCTION
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs), such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), often encourages or requires members to disclose any patents
that might read on a standard under consideration, to “declare”
any patents that may be essential to that standard, and to
commit to license those patents on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND) or “fair, reasonable, and nondiscrimina1
tory” (FRAND) terms. SSOs themselves, however, typically do
not define what a FRAND royalty for any given standard2
essential patent (SEP) would be, and when negotiations break
down litigants increasingly are calling upon courts to set the
3
amount of the royalty. The courts in turn have articulated
various principles for setting FRAND royalties, among them:
1. See, e.g., IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.2 (INST. OF ELEC. &
ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/
sb_bylaws.pdf; ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE ANNEX 6, 6.2 (EUROPEAN
TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST. 2008), http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/
Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf; see also RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A
STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF
STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 48–99 (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_
072197.pdf (reporting the disclosure and licensing obligations among twelve
leading SSOs as of 2012). In the literature and case law, the acronyms
“RAND” and “FRAND” are used interchangeably. In this Article, we use the
term “FRAND” (which appears to be gaining in popularity) unless we are quoting from a source that uses the alternative term “RAND.”
2. A few SSOs require members to license SEPs on a royalty-free basis,
but this does not appear to be the majority practice. See Jorge L. Contreras,
Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 173–75 (2013) (stating that some SSOs encourage or require members to disclose the maximum royalty rates they would
seek). SSOs generally have avoided setting FRAND royalties for a variety of
reasons. But see Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47
HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1027–29, 1046 n.65 (2010) (suggesting that “firms might
prefer the ambiguous RAND commitment over a more conventional, explicit
pricing term” due to “the desirable absence of lawyers,” time constraints, lack
of information about the value of the technology at the point in time at which
a standard is adopted, and out of concerns over antitrust liability).
3. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308,
2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (determining the amount of a
FRAND royalty in an infringement action); see also Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (reviewing the district court’s
“lengthy, thorough bench trial on the RAND rate and range”); Ericsson, Inc. v.
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(1) The royalty should prevent SEP owners from exercising patent
4
“hold-up.”
(2) Courts should minimize the risk of “royalty stacking,” in which a
seller incurs an excessive royalty burden as a result of marketing a
5
product incorporating multiple, separately owned patents.
(3) A FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental ex ante value of
6
the technology in comparison with alternatives.

D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing a jury’s determination of a FRAND royalty in a patent infringement action); Apple Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the expert’s testimony
regarding royalty rates was admissible and improperly excluded by the district court in an infringement action). Courts in Japan and China also have
determined FRAND royalties. For further discussion, see Norman V.
Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined FRAND Royalties, in 1
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW (Jorge L.
Contreras ed., forthcoming 2017).
4. See Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1031, 1052 (“[T]he very purpose of the
RAND agreement is to promote adoption of a standard by decreasing the risk
of hold-up.”), aff ’g No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 25, 2013) (“[A] proper methodology used to determine a RAND royalty
should therefore recognize and seek to mitigate the risk of patent hold-up that
RAND commitments are intended to avoid.”); Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at
*8 (“[O]ne of the primary purposes of the RAND commitment is to avoid patent hold-up, which occurs when the holder of a standard-essential patent demands excess royalties after standard implementers are already locked into
using the standard.”); cf. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1234 (“The district court need
not instruct the jury on hold-up or stacking unless the accused infringer presents actual evidence of hold-up or stacking.”).
5. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *86 (stating that “RAND is informed by two prevailing concerns: preventing stacking and eliminating holdup,” and that “among these two goals, the anti-stacking principle is the primary constraint on the upper bound of RAND”); see also Microsoft, 795 F.3d at
1031; Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *9–10; cf. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209
(acknowledging the potential for royalty stacking “when a standard implicates
numerous patents”); id. at 1234 (affirming the district court’s refusal to give a
jury instruction on royalty stacking, for lack of evidence that stacking was a
real, as opposed to a theoretical, issue that negotiating parties would have addressed). Royalty stacking can be viewed as a manifestation of the “Cournot
complements” problem, which arises “when separate owners of complementary
inputs each demand what is (for them) the individually profit-maximizing
price, in exchange for permission to include those inputs in an end product,”
with the result that “the cost of producing the end product” will be “higher
than the social optimum.” Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies,
and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1169 (2009); see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2, at 23 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013
(2007) (“The Theory of Cournot complements teaches us that the royalty stacking problem is likely to be worse the greater the number of independent owners of patents that read on a product.”).
6. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *19 (stating that the court should
“consider the utility and advantages of the patented property over alternatives
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(4) The royalty should be proportionate to the technology’s importance to the standard and to users of the standard (the “propor7
tionality” principle).
(5) The royalty should not reflect “any value added by the standardization of that technology,” that is, “by the standard’s adoption of the
8
patented technology” —or, as another court put it, simply, “the value
9
of the standard.”

that could have been written into the standard instead of the patented technology in the period before the standard was adopted,” because “the presence
of equally effective alternatives to the patented technology that could have
been adopted into the standard will drive down the royalty that the patent
holder could reasonably demand”); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13 (stating that “ex ante examination of the incremental contribution of the patented
technology to the standard can be helpful in determining a RAND rate in the
context of a dispute over a RAND royalty rate,” and that “comparison of the
patented technology to the alternatives that the SSO could have written into
the standard is a consideration in determining a RAND royalty”).
7. The court in Microsoft refers both to the importance of the patent to
the standard and its importance to users’ products. Microsoft, 2013 WL
2111217, at *3, *20 (characterizing as “central to the court’s analysis” the
principle “that the parties in a hypothetical negotiation would set RAND royalty rates by looking at the importance of the SEPs to the standard and the
importance of the standard and the SEPs to the products at issue,” and stating
that “a patent that is extremely important and central to the standard would
reasonably command a higher royalty rate than a less important patent”). The
court in Innovatio merges the two. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *8 (“[Because] the appropriate royalty base in this case is the Wi-Fi chip, [the purpose
of which is] to provide 802.11 functionality, determining the importance of
Innovatio’s patents to the 802.11 standard also determines the importance of
those patents to the Wi-Fi chip. Accordingly, the court’s analysis does not include a separate section evaluating the importance of Innovatio’s patents to
the accused products, but instead merges that analysis into the inquiry about
the importance of Innovatio’s patents to the 802.11 standard.”); see also Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232–33 (“Just as we apportion damages for a patent that covers a small part of a device, we must also apportion damages for SEPs that
cover only a small part of a standard.”).
8. See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232 (“When dealing with SEPs, there are
two special apportionment issues that arise. First, the patented feature must
be apportioned from all of the unpatented features reflected in the standard.
Second, the patentee’s royalty must be premised on the value of the patented
feature, not any value added by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology. These steps are necessary to ensure that the royalty award is based on
the incremental value that the patented invention adds to the product, not any
value added by the standardization of that technology.”); see also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Res. Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (quoting Ericsson).
9. Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1053 (“The fact that Motorola’s patents were of
minor import to the H.264 standard . . . was evidence from which the jury
could infer that demanding a 2.25% royalty rate was not a good-faith effort to
realize the value of the technology, but rather an attempt to capitalize on the
value of the standard itself—that is, to obtain the hold-up value.”); Microsoft,
2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (“The ability of a holder of an SEP to demand more
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(6) The royalty should be adequate to preserve the patent incentive
10
(the “incentive to invent” principle).
(7) The royalty should provide an adequate incentive to participate in
the standard setting process (the “incentive to participate” princi11
ple).

Unfortunately, the courts have not been entirely clear
about how one might go about trying to satisfy all of these principles (or whether doing so is even possible). Outside the
FRAND context, courts often consider the fifteen amorphous
12
Georgia-Pacific factors to determine the amount of a reasonthan the value of its patented technology and to attempt to capture the value
of the standard itself is referred to as patent ‘hold-up.’”); see also Innovatio,
2013 WL 5593609, at *8 (quoting Microsoft); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869
F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“The purpose of the FRAND requirements . . . is to confine the patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by
the patent itself as distinct from the additional value—the hold-up value—
conferred by the patent’s being designated as standard-essential.”), rev’d in
part on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
10. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *11 (“[A] RAND rate must be set
high enough to ensure that innovators in the future have an appropriate incentive to invest in future developments and to contribute their inventions to
the standard-setting process.”); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *80 (“[S]ince
licensing through SSOs under the RAND commitment is, at least for some entities, an important component of profitability, reducing that component would
reduce the incentive to innovate and thereby slow the pace of innovation in the
economy.”). The idea that damages should be adequate to preserve the patent
incentive scheme is uncontroversial. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v.
Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[L]ost profits compensation . . . preserves constitutional incentives.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION
52 (2011) (“The ability of patentees to allege patent infringement and enter ex
post transactions is a necessary feature supporting the patent system’s incentives to innovate. . . . Either royalty payments or an exclusive market position
can allow a patentee to capture returns from its investment in making and developing an invention, which creates incentives for innovation.”). Though
whether that incentive is necessary to induce invention, disclosure, innovation, and other social benefits, and whether courts could in some instances adjust patent remedies to better ensure that the reward is commensurate with
these benefits, are interesting, but separate issues. For discussion, see, for example, Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92
TEX. L. REV. 517, 554–69 (2014) (arguing that, ideally, courts would award
damages sufficient to maintain the patent incentive, which could be higher or
lower than the patentee’s but-for damages).
11. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *11; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217,
at *12 (“To induce the creation of valuable standards, the RAND commitment
must guarantee that holders of valuable intellectual property will receive reasonable royalties on that property.”); see also Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Payments and Participation: The Incentives To Join Cooperative Standard Setting
Efforts, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 24 (2014) (discussing the impact of a
licensing cap on standard setting).
12. See Georgia-Pac. Co. v. U.S. Plywood Co., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
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able royalty, a practice critics sometimes deride as enabling the
13
trier of fact to award damages in almost any amount. Does a
similar risk arise that, by invoking the seven principles listed
above, a court could characterize almost any damages award as
consistent with FRAND terms? Are the principles themselves
mutually consistent, or should some of them be modified or discarded? Might there be some deeper, foundational principle
that could unite some or all of the above into a coherent whole?
This Article proposes, as a foundational principle, that a
FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental contribution of
14
the patent to the value of the standard to the user. This principle combines three related ideas we develop and defend in the
body of the Article. The first is that royalties should reflect the
hypothetical bargain that reasonable parties would have struck
ex ante (prior to incurring sunk costs) in light of the incremental value of the technology over unpatented alternatives as
revealed ex post (an approach we refer to in a companion paper
15
as “contingent ex ante”). Second, multiple patents reading on
a standard should be valued in proportion to their marginal
contribution to the standard (what we refer to below as “ex post
Shapley pricing”). Third, the value of the standard to the user

(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen potentially relevant factors for calculating reasonable royalties), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971); see
also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–36 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (applying the Georgia-Pacific factors).
13. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific
Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 5 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1704
(2010) (providing an overview of the various sources of criticism). In the
FRAND context, the courts in Innovatio and Microsoft both applied modified
versions of the Georgia-Pacific factors. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at
*5–8; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *17–20.
14. Some other commentators have proposed that a FRAND royalty
should reflect the marginal or incremental contribution of the patent to the
standard. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in
Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 693 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND,
Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931, 980–81 (2013). However,
as will become apparent in the text above, the meaning they accord this principle is materially different from ours.
15. Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2528616. To be more precise, under the
contingent ex ante approach the patentee is entitled to the value of the patented technology ex ante (that is, prior to incurring sunk costs) given that the
patent is chosen for inclusion in the standard, over the value of the next-best
unpatented technology ex ante had that technology been chosen for inclusion
in the standard. See infra note 42, Part III.A, Appendix B.
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determines the user’s maximum willingness to pay. The user is
not interested in licensing patent rights as such; what the user
16
wants is the right to use the standard. The amount the user is
willing to pay for that right therefore depends on the value of
the standard to the user, not on matters such as how many
patents read on the technology, whether those patents are held
by one patentee or by many, whether the standard was formally developed by an SSO or arose de facto, or whether the
value results from widespread adoption due to network effects,
efficient design, or the whims of fashion. None of these factors
affect the value of the standard to the user, and consequently,
none should affect the reasonable royalty the user is required
to pay. As we will show, our approach is more firmly grounded
in innovation policy than any of the competing approaches advanced to date. Moreover, our proposal provides a foundation
for interpreting the seven principles articulated above that will
enable courts to apply those principles in a coherent and consistent manner.
The key to understanding our approach rests on unpacking
Principle (5)’s reference to the “value of the standard.” As we
will show, courts and others have used this or similar terms in
reference to three distinct phenomena, which we refer to as
“sunk costs holdup,” “network value appropriation,” and the
“apportionment problem.” Sunk costs holdup may arise whenever the adoption of a standard requires users to incur investment-specific sunk costs. Here the concern is that a patentee
armed with an injunction might be able to extract some portion
of those sunk costs, above and beyond the value of its inven17
tion. So understood, sunk costs holdup is not limited to the
standards context—or even the patent context—though in practice standards often do require implementers to make transaction-specific investments. Consequently, in some sense sunk
18
costs holdup can be (and sometimes is) described as capturing

16. See David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties To Value Patented
Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 116–18 (2014) (arguing that the fundamental
goal of patent remedies should be to accurately value the patented technology,
because doing so serves the public policy purpose of providing optimal incentives to invent).
17. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 612–13 (2007); see also infra Part I.
18. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031, 1053 (9th
Cir. 2015); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 5; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 62–63 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
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the value of standardization, although strictly what is captured
by the patentee is some part of the user’s sunk costs that are
incurred on standardization.
The second phenomenon, network value appropriation,
arises whenever the value of a particular technology increases
19
upon standardization due to the presence of network effects.
As with sunk costs holdup, an injunction would enable the patentee to extract a higher royalty ex post than it could have negotiated ex ante, and thus this too might be described as resulting in the capture of some of the value of the standard—though
in this context, the increase in value is due to network effects
and does not depend on the presence of transaction-specific
sunk costs.
While both of the preceding phenomena could arise even
when a standard incorporates just a single patent, the apportionment problem arises when a standard embodies multiple
patents, each of which contributes only some portion of the
20
overall value of the standard. Because each patent is essential
to the implementation of the standard, one patentee armed
with an injunction can capture the full value of the standard
from a user, even though it adds only a small part of the value
of the standard. The apportionment problem does not depend
on transaction-specific investments by the user; rather it turns,
2013); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, COMMENTARY ON PATENT DAMAGES AND
REMEDIES, PUBLIC COMMENT VERSION 26–27 (2014).
19. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
20. Many patents declared to be essential are not in fact essential. See,
e.g., FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL
TO LTE AND SAE (4G WIRELESS STANDARDS) THROUGH JUNE 30, 2009, at 2
(2010), http://www.frlicense.com/LTE%20Final%20Report.pdf (reporting that
only fifty percent of 210 declared-essential patents studied were essential as
judged by the authors’ panel of experts). We exclude such patents on the view
that, in principle, a user can resist any excessive royalty demands that turn on
essentiality by showing that the patent is not essential. (Note that the user
nonetheless might be subjected to excessive demands based on sunk costs
holdup, as this does not depend on the patent being essential.) Further, a patent may also be essential to either a mandatory or optional part of the standard; IEEE-SA Bylaw 6.1, for example, defines both to be “essential.” IEEE-SA
STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015),
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf. We will use
the term essential to mean a patent that is essential to the standard as implemented by the user. That includes all patents that are essential to mandatory aspects of the standard, and all patents that are essential to an optional
part if that option is implemented by the particular user. A user will not be
liable to pay any excessive royalty—or indeed any royalty—for a patent that is
essential to an optional part of the standard that the user does not implement,
because it will not infringe.
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albeit indirectly, on network effects, because the patentee’s
ability to demand more than the value of its own contribution
derives from the fact that the user would have to abandon the
21
standard if it does not license the patent. The three phenom22
ena can be compared and contrasted using the following table :
Table 1: Three Distinct Phenomena
Feature
Phenomenon
Sunk costs
holdup
Network value
appropriation
Apportionment

Transactionspecific
investment
by users

Network
effects

More than
one patent

REQUIRED

NOT
REQUIRED

NOT
REQUIRED
NOT
REQUIRED

REQUIRED

NOT
REQUIRED
NOT
REQUIRED

REQUIRED

REQUIRED

We argue that these three phenomena have distinct policy
implications. While all can be described as involving holdup, in
the loose sense that a patentee armed with an injunction can
obtain a higher royalty after standardization than before, the
economic implications—and, consequently, the appropriate response—are very different. Sunk costs holdup has adverse effects on both user behavior, by making investment riskier, and
on inventor behavior, by creating an excessive incentive to pat23
ent. Sunk costs holdup is appropriately addressed by use of an
21. One might imagine that the user could avoid the apportionment problem simply by redesigning its product to avoid using a patented technology
that contributes little or no value to that particular user, especially if the ability to advertise that its product is standard-compliant is not commercially valuable. However, the licensing terms for the other patents that are essential to
the standard will typically contain a term specifying that the license extends
only to products that comply with the standard, which means that the user
cannot abandon a minor technology without abandoning the important technologies at the same time. See STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY
MANUAL 60–61 (AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON TECH. STANDARDIZATION SECTION
OF SCI. & TECH. LAW) (discussing clause k).
22. “Required” in the table means that a feature (e.g., network effects)
must be present for the phenomenon (e.g., network value appropriation) to exist, whereas “Not Required” means that the phenomenon (e.g., sunk costs
holdup) is not dependent on the feature (e.g., network effects). “Not Required”
does not imply that the feature is irrelevant. Network effects may exacerbate
sunk costs holdup, for example, even though sunk costs holdup is not dependent on the presence of network effects.
23. See infra Part II.C.
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ex ante hypothetical negotiation framework, in which the parties are assumed to bargain before any sunk costs are in24
curred. By contrast, network value appropriation does not
have any adverse effects on either user or patentee behavior,
other than those that are inherent in the patent system generally. Consequently, network value appropriation is not a concern that should be addressed in assessing FRAND royalties,
and it is a mistake to conflate this phenomenon with sunk costs
holdup. Indeed, we argue that the incentive-to-invent and incentive-to-participate principles require that the SEP owner
should be able to capture some portion of the network effects (if
any) arising from standardization, though not the sunk costs.
Thus, we recommend that, in contrast to the “pure” or incremental ex ante approach as embodied in Principle (3), courts
should construct the bargain the patentee and the implementer
would have negotiated ex ante (thus avoiding sunk costs
holdup), but with awareness of all relevant information that is
revealed ex post, including the fact that the patent was incorporated into the standard.
Finally, the apportionment problem has adverse effects on
patentee behavior by potentially overcompensating minor inventions and on user behavior to the extent it contributes to
25
royalty stacking. Moreover, because the apportionment problem relates to the division of royalties among patentees, it is
not properly addressed by the timing of the negotiation between the patentee and the user. Instead, we argue, it should
be addressed by ex post Shapley pricing, which applies the
26
well-established economic concept of Shapley pricing to the
patents actually selected to be part of the standard, in order to
assess the relative value of various contributions to a standard
in a manner that is both intuitively appealing and sound in
terms of economic incentives. In particular, ex post Shapley
pricing provides a way to estimate the value of individual SEPs
that satisfies both the proportionality principle and the “avoid
royalty stacking” principle, while also enabling a reasoned interpretation of what it should mean for courts to avoid basing
27
FRAND royalties on “the value of the standard.”

24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra note 43.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part II.E.
See infra Part III.C.
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Put another way, when coupled with the contingent ex
ante approach, ex post Shapley pricing results in a royalty that
reflects the incremental contribution of the patent to the value of
the standard to the user. This has both positive and negative
implications for the existing theories of how to calculate
28
FRAND royalties. On the one hand, under our proposal a patentee cannot capture more than the patent’s incremental contribution to the value of the standard, as the “ex ante” aspect
ensures that the patentee cannot capture any part of the user’s
sunk costs. To that extent, our approach reflects the established consensus. On the other hand, we reject the common
view that the patentee should be confined to the value of its
technology prior to standardization and argue instead that the
patentee should be able to capture some portion of the invention’s increase in value attributable to network effects, as revealed ex post. Importantly, Shapley pricing ensures that any
individual patentee is confined to its incremental contribution
to that value. The application of Shapley pricing ex post (to the
patents actually selected for inclusion in the standard) is consistent with the principle of conditioning the hypothetical negotiation on knowledge of which patents actually were selected to
be part of the standard, and also is intended to maintain the
appropriate incentive to invent.
To be sure, our proposed approach, like most idealized
models, probably cannot be directly implemented in practice. It
is nonetheless useful as a conceptual benchmark for assessing
the merits of more practical methodologies and comparators,
29
which should serve as proxies for the theoretical ideal. Our
approach also provides a principled way of interpreting the
valuation principles articulated in the emerging case law, as
well as the recently adopted IEEE-SA Bylaws (which, like some
of the cases cited above, states that a FRAND royalty should
not include the value resulting from a patent’s inclusion in a
30
standard). Properly understood, these statements should preclude courts from awarding royalties based on sunk costs

28. See infra Part III.D.
29. See infra Part III.D.
30. See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. &
ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/
sb_bylaws.pdf. (defining a “Reasonable Rate” as meaning “appropriate compensation to the patent holder for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim
excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard”).
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holdup, and from allowing SEPs that add little value to a standard to capture a substantial portion of the standard’s ex post
value—though not from allowing the recovery of some portion
of the value added by standardization.
Part I below distinguishes the concepts of sunk costs
holdup and network value appropriation, while Part II critiques the “auction model” that is the best known formal model
of the incremental ex ante approach. Part III then lays out our
proposed framework, under which the royalty reflects the incremental contribution of the patent to the value of the standard to the user and its implications for real-world practice.
I. SUNK COSTS HOLDUP AND NETWORK VALUE
APPROPRIATION
We begin our analysis by distinguishing between “sunk
costs holdup,” which depends on technology-specific invest31
ments made by the user, and “network value appropriation,”
32
which depends on network effects. The fact that the mechanisms giving rise to these phenomena are distinct is not in itself a novel point, but the distinction nonetheless is routinely
33
overlooked in the SEP literature.
The problem of sunk costs is not confined to the standards
context, or even to patents. It arises whenever a transaction is
subject to “durable investments in transaction-specific human
34
or physical assets” made by at least one party. For convenience, we will refer to transaction-specific investments as “sunk
costs,” where the transaction specificity is left implicit. If the
rights of the party who has made asset-specific investments are
not fully defined prior to those investments being made (“ex
ante”), that party may be subject to having the terms of the
transaction (re-)negotiated in a way that allows the counter35
party to capture some part of the value of the sunk costs.

31.
32.
33.
34.

See Farrell et al., supra note 17, at 612–14.
See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
See Sidak, supra note 14, at 1022; supra text accompanying note 18.
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 61 (1985).
35. See id. at 64–67 (developing the theory of opportunism based on assetspecificity as an explanation for vertical integration, and noting that in the
long-term the fact that supply arrangements need to adapt to changing environmental conditions implies that the terms of a contractual supply agreement
cannot be fully negotiated ex ante). See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The
Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
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An example of this phenomenon in the non-SEP patent
context is provided by Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production
36
Co. The invention at issue related to a method for installing
37
the foundation for an oil drilling platform. Shell had built
such a platform but was found to have infringed Riles’ patent
38
when it placed the foundations. The value of the patented
method over alternative noninfringing methods was roughly
39
$350,000. Accordingly, had the parties negotiated a license ex
ante, before work on the foundations had commenced, Shell
would not have been willing to pay more than that amount for
the right to use the patented method. Once the foundations
were in place, the platform was built on top at a cost of $84 mil40
lion. Had an injunction been available to enjoin the use of the
platform in consequence of the infringement, Shell would have
been willing to pay more than $84,000,000 for the right to use
the invention, even though the value of the patented invention
itself was only the $350,000 cost advantage it provided over the
41
best available alternative. This potential to capture some of
the infringer’s sunk costs is what we mean by “sunk costs
42
holdup.”

ECON. REV. 112 (1971) (discussing vertical integration in a firm context).
36. Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
37. Id. at 1305.
38. Id. at 1306.
39. See id. at 1313 (noting Shell’s evidence to that effect). The evidence
was contested, but for purposes of this example it is sufficient that it is plausible that the value of the invention as compared with the alternative is substantially less than the value of the platform itself.
40. See id. at 1311.
41. This assumes the project would be profitable even using the alternative technology, so that walking away entirely does not make sense. In that
case, licensing saves the $84,000,000 cost of a new platform, plus the cost of
placing new foundations with non-infringing technology.
42. More precisely, what we refer to in the text above as “sunk costs
holdup” arises when the patentee armed with an injunction can extract the
user’s sunk costs plus the opportunity cost of not having chosen a
noninfringing alternative ex ante. For a formal analysis, see Norman
Siebrasse & Thomas Cotter, Why Switching Costs Are Irrelevant to Patent
Holdup, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Sept. 24, 2015), http://
comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2015/09/why-switching-costs-are
-irrelevant-to_24.html. For other illustrative examples of sunk costs holdup,
see Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of
FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 538–41 (2013); Farrell et al., supra note 17, at 616; Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Preventing Patent Hold Up: An
Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting,
37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 455–57 (2009); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2001–
02.
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In practice, U.S. courts can reduce the risk of holdup by exercising their discretion to deny injunctive relief in cases like
43
Riles. Note, however, that if the court were to award (or the
parties were to negotiate) a reasonable royalty based on the
amount that a patentee would be able to extract if armed with
an injunction, the holdup problem would re-emerge. For this
reason, the reasonable royalty should be (and is) assessed by
means of an ex ante hypothetical negotiation, which is assumed
to take place before the user has incurred any sunk costs.
Network value appropriation, by contrast, depends on network effects. Network effects arise when the value a user derives from consumption of a good increases with the number of
44
other agents consuming the good. Communication technologies are a classic example: the more people that have tele45
phones, the more valuable a telephone is to any given person.
While network effects may arise in the absence of standards,
and de facto standards may arise as a consequence of network
effects even in the absence of formal standards, a major reason
for the existence of formal standards is to allow the market to
coordinate on a single technology in order to reap the benefits
46
of network externalities. Consequently, formal standards are
normally associated with network effects.
When network effects are significant, adoption of a standard increases the value of the market by enabling parties to
47
coordinate on a common technology. Prior to standardization,
no single patentee acting independently can capture any part of
the value derived from standardization, absent foreknowledge
that its patent (as opposed to someone else’s) will be selected

43. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Also, on the facts in Riles, the Federal Circuit held
that Shell could not be enjoined from using the platform on the basis of the
infringement of the method patent, because any injunction must be tailored to
the specific infringement, though this particular response will not be generally
applicable. 298 F.3d at 1311–12. Applying a well-established rule, the court in
Riles also held damages in the form of a reasonable royalty must be based on a
hypothetical negotiation taking place ex ante, before any asset-specific investments are made, precisely so that the patentee is prevented from capturing any of the holdup value associated with the asset-specific investments
made by the infringer. See id. at 1313. On the ex ante hypothetical negotiation, see generally Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15.
44. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 434.
47. See id.
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48

for inclusion in the standard. After standardization, however,
a patentee whose technology is included in the standard can extract a royalty that reflects the widespread use of that technol49
ogy due to network effects. We refer to the ability of the patentee to capture the value added by standardization as
“network value appropriation.” As with sunk costs holdup, a
patentee armed with an injunction can extract more from a
user ex post than it would have been able to extract ex ante (before the sunk costs were incurred or the standard adopted).
Sunk costs holdup and network value appropriation often
occur together, because the adoption of a particular standard
often requires (or at least invites) technology-specific investments. For this reason, and because both phenomena enable
patent owners to extract higher royalties ex post than they
would have been able to extract ex ante, they often are treated
as a single problem warranting the same solution. For example,
in an influential paper Daniel G. Swanson and William J.
Baumol propose that a (F)RAND royalty is one that approximates the outcome of an ex ante auction in which patents com50
pete to be included in the standard. At the conclusion of such
an auction, each “winning” patent would be entitled to a royalty
equal to its incremental value over the next-best alternative
51
that was available ex ante. At first blush, this “incremental ex
ante” approach seems appealing because it evokes the widely
accepted principle that reasonable royalty awards should equal
the amount to which a willing licensor and licensee would have
agreed ex ante—before the patent was infringed or, in the present context, before the standard was adopted—in view of the
52
advantages of the patented technology over other alternatives.
48. See id. at 435.
49. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION 7 (2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2007/07/11/222655.pdf.
50. Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market
Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6 (2005); see also Layne-Farrar et al., supra note
14, at 688–93 (extending the Swanson-Baumol model).
51. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 15–21.
52. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“[T]he hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach[ ] attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties
would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before
infringement began[, recreating] as best as possible . . . the ex ante licensing
negotiation scenario and . . . resulting agreement.”); Georgia-Pac. Co. v. U.S.
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As Swanson and Baumol argue, this approach would prevent
SEP owners from engaging in patent “holdup” by demanding ex
post royalties that are higher than the royalties to which they
53
would have agreed at an ex ante auction. But the approach
treats both network value appropriation and sunk costs holdup
in the same way. Thus, while Swanson and Baumol explicitly
identify what we are referring to as sunk costs holdup and network value appropriation as distinct mechanisms by which an
SSO’s selection of a patent “may have economic effects that
convert a previously competitive technology market into one
54
that is subject ex post to market or monopoly power,” they
view the two phenomena as giving rise to a unified problem,
55
namely “the problem of ex post market power.”

Plywood Co., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other
grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). In the SEP context, courts have begun to
shift the time frame for the hypothetical negotiations, from just before the patent was infringed to just before the standard was adopted. See In re Innovatio
IP Ventures, LLC. Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *19
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Microsoft Co. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013
WL 2111217, at *19 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.
2015); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
53. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 10–11 (“If the primary goal of
obtaining RAND licensing commitments is to prevent IP holders from setting
royalties that exercise market power created by standardization, then the concept of a ‘reasonable’ royalty for purposes of RAND licensing must be defined
and implemented by reference to ex ante competition, i.e., competition in advance of standard selection.”).
54. Id. at 9–10.
55. Id. at 15. Some other work similarly specifically identifies both sunk
costs holdup and network value appropriation as distinct phenomena. For example, a joint report of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission explicitly distinguishes what we have called sunk costs holdup
and network value appropriation, but then treats them as a single problem
creating a distinction between “the licensing terms a patent holder could obtain solely based on the merits of its technology and the terms that it could
obtain because its technology was included in the standard.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 49, at 38–39 & n.25. More commonly, however, the two phenomena are not explicitly distinguished. Some
authors simply define holdup as “a demand for higher royalties or other more
costly licensing terms after the standard is implemented than could have been
obtained before the standard was chosen.” Request for Comments and Announcement of Workshop on Standard-Setting Issues, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,036
(Fed. Trade Comm’n May 13, 2011). Others use similar terms that encompass
both sunk costs holdup and network value appropriation. Indeed, most of the
articles referring to patent holdup provide examples that are specific to sunk
costs holdup alone. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1451, 1487 (2015); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2001–02. We
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Treating sunk costs holdup and network value appropriation alike would not be problematic if they gave rise to the
same functional problem; we do not dispute that both phenomena allow an SEP owner to charge more after the standard is
adopted than it could have charged ex ante. We nevertheless
claim that “holdup” in this sense alone is not a problem. More
precisely, sunk costs holdup results in inefficient user and pat56
entee behavior. However, network value appropriation has no
static efficiency implications beyond those that arise from the
above-marginal cost pricing that is fundamental to the patent
system and is actually desirable from a dynamic efficiency perspective. Consequently, to treat them together is to conflate two
functionally different issues.
An example is useful to understand our objection. Consider
a stylized wireless local area network (WLAN) technology. Assume that there are network externalities, so that the more users there are of a particular Wi-Fi technology, the more any individual user will be willing to pay to license that technology.
To isolate the issue of network value appropriation, assume
that only one patented technology is required to implement the
Wi-Fi technology (which allows us to ignore both royalty stacking and the problem of apportionment). Assume further that
the user’s marginal cost of implementing Wi-Fi technology,
57
apart from any royalty, is negligible. This allows us to ignore
the problem of sunk costs for the moment. Assume that all users are identical, so that the “nondiscriminatory” part of the
FRAND requirement need not be addressed. Also assume that
do not disagree with these papers’ conclusions that sunk costs holdup should
be avoided. Our argument is simply that standardization gives rise to another
phenomenon, network value appropriation, which does not threaten the same
inefficiencies as sunk costs holdup.
56. There is a lively debate as to how serious the sunk costs problem in
fact is in the context of SEPs. Compare, e.g., Alexander Galetovic et al., An
Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
549, 550 (arguing that patent holdup is not a serious problem), with Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2025–35 (arguing that patent holdup is a serious
problem). By saying the problem of sunk costs holdup is “real,” we do not mean
to be taking any position on this empirical question. We mean only that the
problem can arise, and must be addressed, even though the ultimate conclusion may be that in practice it is not sufficiently serious to warrant a specific
legal response.
57. Perhaps all of the competing technologies are embodied on an easily
removable chip, similar to a cell phone SIM card. This is itself inexpensive
apart from any royalties associated with the embodied technology, so that
switching from one technology to another is simply a matter of switching the
card.
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the technology has no other application so if it is not incorporated into the patent it is worthless. This means we do not need
to consider the patentee’s incentive to participate, because the
patentee’s outside option is always less than (or at most, equal
to) the value of participating. Finally, assume that the patentee’s marginal cost of implementing the technology is also
zero. This simplifies the numerical examples by fixing the
minimum royalty a patentee is willing to accept at zero.
In Scenario 1 the market is mature, but fragmented: there
are ten firms that have developed and patented WLAN technology, A, B, . . . I, J, all of which are equally good. Each of the
ten technologies has been adopted by one hundred users who
use it in isolated networks, such as within a single firm. Each
user would be willing to pay up to $10 annually for a license to
the patented technology it has adopted, but the users and the
patentees have equal bargaining power, so each user has licensed the technology from its respective patentee for $5 annu58
ally and each patentee receives $500. The total consumer surplus is $5000 and the total royalty income received by all the
patentees is $5000, so the total social value of WLAN in the
fragmented market is $10,000. While WLAN is useful in the
isolated networks, it would be even more useful if standardized,
so that individual users could use their WLAN not just at their
own office, but also at outside meetings and coffee shops. Each
of the thousand users would be willing to pay $100 annually for
exactly the same technology they are currently using if all
other users were also using the same technology. Also because
the technologies are all equally good and switching costs are
negligible, any user would be happy to adopt any of the ten
technologies if everyone else did so as well. Coordination problems are all that is stopping a standard from emerging. An SSO
is set up and solves the coordination problem by choosing technology A, which is then adopted by all users. The total annual
social value of WLAN technology is now $100,000.

58. This reflects the usual view that the royalty will fall in the bargaining
range defined by the patentee’s marginal cost, which we assume for convenience to be zero, and the user’s maximum willingness to pay, which is determined by the value of the invention as compared with the best alternative
(which, in this example, we have assumed to be $10). A $5 royalty, which falls
in the middle of the bargaining range, would be the Nash Bargaining Solution
if the parties have equal bargaining power. However, nothing in our analysis
turns on the Nash Bargaining Solution; any other number in the bargaining
range would serve equally well.
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If patentee A, whose technology was adopted as the standard, was able to obtain an injunction against any party using
the standard, A would be able to extract up to $100 from each
user. Patentee A could not extract more, because a user would
prefer to pay $10 to use a non-standard technology within its
firm, rather than pay more than $100 to use the standard technology anywhere. But the user would strictly prefer to adopt
the standard technology A for any royalty less than $100. The
exact amount of the license will depend on the relative bargaining power of the parties. If the parties have the same bargaining power as in the fragmented market, A would be able to license the same technology to each user for $50 annually, for a
total of $50,000, even though before standardization it was only
59
able to charge $5 to its own users, for a total of $500.
As discussed above, it has become a commonplace to state
that A is entitled to the (incremental) “value of the patented
technology” itself, as contrasted with the value that arises from
standardization, but the cases do not specify exactly what is
60
meant by either concept. The value of standardization is presumably the difference between the value of the standard and
the value of the patented technology, but both of these concepts
are ambiguous. The “value of the standard” in the present example could be understood as the $100,000 social value of the
standardized technology in Scenario 1, or it might be understood as the amount that a patentee armed with an injunction
could actually extract (which, if the parties had equal bargaining power, would be $50,000). The value of the invention could
be understood as the $500 that patentee A was in fact receiving
annually prior to standardization. Or it might be the ex ante
consumer surplus, which is $1000 in our example. It might
even be argued that the value of the technology is equal to the
full value of the market to all patentees prior to standardization ($5000), or even the full social value prior to standardization ($10,000), based on the view that WLAN technology is
59. Since bargaining power may reflect risk-aversion, it is not strictly correct to assume that the parties will have the same bargaining power in the
standardized market as in the fragmented market. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, THE
CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 80–81 (1989). We assume
that the bargaining power remains the same simply for numerical convenience. Nothing turns on the point; our argument turns only on the point that
the patentee whose technology is selected as the standard is able to extract
more ex post, in the standardized market, than it could have demanded ex
ante, in the fragmented market.
60. See supra notes 8–9.
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worth that much even if not standardized. Alternatively, we
might take it to be the amount that patentee A would have
been willing to accept in an ex ante negotiation between the
parties in order to be selected as the standard. This amount
depends on the details of the hypothetical negotiation. As we
will see, in Swanson & Baumol’s model this would be $0 on the
61
facts in Scenario 1. Whether the value of the patented technology is taken to be $0, $500, $1000, $5000 or $10,000, does
not affect our basic point. We will argue that even a substantially higher royalty—say, one in which the patentee and the
users share equally in the additional value created by standardization—could be considered fair and reasonable. With
that said, the ambiguity as to what actually constitutes the
value of standardization signals an important conceptual problem, to which we will return in due course.
Now consider Scenario 2, in which initially there is no
WLAN at all. The same firm A as in Scenario 1 develops and
patents the same technology A, but in Scenario 2, no other firm
develops a competing technology. As in Scenario 1, each user’s
maximum willingness to pay for a standardized technology is
$100, but in this scenario technology A is the de facto standard,
so users are willing to pay up to that amount to license from
patentee A when it first develops the technology. After bargain62
ing, the parties agree to a royalty of $50. The result is that in
Scenario 2, A will reap $50,000 of the $100,000 social value of
the de facto standardized WLAN market.
In Scenario 2 we would not say there is anything wrong
with A capturing a substantial part of the social value of the
63
technology. On the contrary, this is a classic example of the
patent system working the way it should: the patentee invents
a valuable product, charges what the market will bear and is
rewarded accordingly. Even if subsequent patentees B through

61. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19 (describing a formula on
recurring costs and licensing fees); see also Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14,
at 690.
62. Our analysis depends only on the point that the parties will split the
incremental value of the invention between them, and for a very wide range of
plausible outcomes the patentee will receive more than $10 per user. A royalty
of $10, $1, or $0, which are the salient points in the context of Scenario 1, are
entirely arbitrary in the context of Scenario 2.
63. Note that this does not mean that A captures the entire value of the
invention or the entire consumer surplus. Presumably there will be some consumer surplus accruing to the users, but we do not normally worry about
whether there is consumer surplus or not.
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J then develop their equivalent alternative technology (call this
Scenario 2B), no user will be willing to adopt that technology,
because it offers no technical advantage over technology A, and
64
the network effect value will be lost if they switch. In effect,
the only difference between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is that in
Scenario 2 historical accident solved the coordination problem,
65
while it needed to be solved by an SSO in Scenario 1.
There is a puzzle here. Why should it be a paradigmatic
example of a properly functioning patent system for patentee A
to receive a royalty of $50 per user in Scenario 2, and yet a basic principle of FRAND royalties that the same patentee with
the same technology should not be entitled to more than $10
per user, perhaps even less, in Scenario 1?
One obvious difference between the cases is that in Scenario 2, it is intuitive to say that the entire value of the market
was created by patentee A, while in Scenario 1, the value of the
standardized market was evidently created by standardization,
not by patentee A, whose technology was selected arbitrarily.
From a fairness perspective, it might seem that in Scenario 2,
patentee A is deservedly capturing the value of its own invention, while in Scenario 1 it is undeservedly capturing the value
of standardization. But if we look at matters from the perspective of the users, there is an equally intuitive counterargument:
it seems unfair that the users capture almost the entire value
of the technology in Scenario 1, when they have contributed
66
nothing at all to the development of that technology.

64. Even if B offers to license for $0, users will not switch, because their
individual surplus will be only $10 (the value of using an isolated network),
whereas the user surplus is $50 if they license the de facto standard technology from A for $50. At most, the ex post competition will ensure that A cannot
demand more than $90 for its technology.
65. See Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the
Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 794 (2014)
(noting the functional equivalent between standard setting through an SSO
and through a “standards war”).
66. Cf. Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Logic and Limits of
Ex Ante Competition in a Standard Setting Environment, 3 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 79, 93 (2007) (noting that consumers reap the benefits of standardization).
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II. CRITIQUE OF THE AUCTION MODEL
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
As noted, Swanson and Baumol identify both sunk costs
holdup and network value appropriation as creating ex post
67
market power. They perceive this as a problem (for reasons we
discuss below), and they provide a single response, namely an
auction model in which patentees bid to be selected for the
standard by making offers, via the SSO, to downstream users
who then select the bid which provides the end user with the
68
greatest net profit. The patentee with the winning bid is selected to be part of the standard. In the auction model, because
the parties bid before the standard is adopted and are then
locked in to their bid, ex ante competition between the parties
69
constrains the price that can be charged ex post. The basic result of the auction model, which Swanson and Baumol propose
70
as a “reasonable” royalty for FRAND purposes, is that the patent will be licensed at a fee “equal to the recurring costs of licensing, plus the difference in value between the best and next71
best IP alternatives.” This result was reflected in the expert
testimony that Judge Robart adopted in Microsoft v. Motorola:
Dr. Schmalensee has likewise acknowledged that, in the event of a
dispute regarding RAND royalties, “[t]he various parties could make
their cases in court for the relative value of their IP contributions to
the standard, in the context of other options considered during the
standard’s early development phases. If a component had multiple alternatives before the standard was settled, its incremental contribu72
tion, properly measured, may be close or equal to zero.”

67. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
68. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 15–21 (explaining the ex
ante auction model). As in our examples, Swanson and Baumol assume that
the standard involves the choice of a single technology. Cf. Layne-Farrar et al.,
supra note 14, at 688 (extending the auction model to the case of multi-patent
standards).
69. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 21 (stating that ex ante
competition can protect market from opportunism).
70. See id.
71. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 686 (summarizing the Swanson
& Baumol model).
72. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (citing Microsoft’s expert), aff ’d,
795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); see also id. at *13 (“If alternatives available to
the patented technology would have provided the same or similar technical
contribution to the standard, the actual value provided by the patented technology is its incremental contribution. . . . Thus, comparison of the patented
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It is this proposition, that an upper bound on a FRAND royalty
is the incremental value of the patent as compared with the alternatives, including patented alternatives, before the standard
was settled, that we challenge.
To see why, consider again our Scenario 1, where the alternative technologies are equally good and there are no recurring costs of licensing. In the auction to be part of the standard,
the payoff to any unsuccessful patentee is zero, so if one patentee bids $1, another patentee would be willing to bid 99¢ rather than lose everything. In the end, the auction will bid the
fee down to the patentee’s marginal cost, which is zero in our
scenario. Thus, in this scenario, the winning bid in the auction
73
model would be $0. By contrast, in Scenario 2, patentee A will
capture the full value of the market, with a royalty of $100 per
user. Patentee A will offer a royalty of $100 because it knows
that is has no competition, and that offer will be accepted because each user strictly prefers to pay $100 than to do without
74
the standardized WLAN technology entirely. As Swanson and
Baumol say, the patentee captures the difference in value be75
tween the best and the next best alternatives. When there is
only one candidate technology, the alternative is the prior
technology—in this case, presumably a combination of cell
phones and wired internet access—and the patentee can capture the full value of the standard. This result illustrates that
under the auction model there is no general principle that the
patentee cannot capture any part of the value of the standard.
Indeed, under the auction model the patentee in Scenario 2 actually captures the entire value of the standardization.

technology to the alternatives that the SSO could have written into the standard is a consideration in determining a RAND royalty.” (citing Microsoft’s expert Kevin Murphy)).
73. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 690 (referring to Case 1);
Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19 (assuming incremental c = 0).
74. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 690–91 (referring to Case 2).
Layne-Farrar et al.’s Case 2 considers a two-patent standard with perfect
competition ex ante for one of the components and no competition for the other, with the result that the patent holder for the component with no competition captures the entire value of the market. Our simplified scenario of a
standard with a single patented technology is a special case in which there is
perfect competition for one component because that component is not patented. Similarly, our scenario can be considered a special case of Layne-Farrar et
al.’s Case 4, in which there is no competition for either of the components, in
which case again the patentees will capture the entire value of the market. See
id. at 691–92.
75. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19, 23.
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In response, one might argue that, even if patentee A captures the value of the standard in Scenario 2, it does not capture the value of standardization, because all of the value of the
standard is embodied in Patent A. In a slightly more complex
example, however, the auction model will allow patentee A to
capture the value of standardization. Suppose that the standard in question requires two patented technologies for its implementation, and there is perfect competition ex ante for one
of the components and no competition for the other. That is,
there is no substitute for technology A, but X, Y, and Z are perfect substitutes for one another. While A is worthless on its
own, any pair (A, X), (A, Y) or (A, Z) will be equally effective.
The result of an ex ante auction in that case is that patentee A
will capture the entire value of the standardized market, while
76
X, Y, or Z—whichever is selected—will get a royalty of zero.
This occurs even though one of X, Y, or Z is also necessary to
the standard, such that A alone is worth much less prior to
standardization. In this case, under the auction model A will
capture the value of the standard even though that value is
created by standardization.
These examples illustrate that, under the incremental ex
ante approach, there is no general principle precluding the patentee from obtaining the value of the standard, or the value of
standardization. Whether the patentee captures all or part of
the value of standardization depends on the nature of the ex
77
ante competition. Indeed, “the value of standardization” has
no independent definition under the auction model. It is defined only implicitly, as the difference between the value of the
standard and the value to which the patentees are entitled under the auction model. The fundamental principle in the auction model is that the patentee is not entitled to more than the
value of the invention, where, crucially, the value of the invention is defined by the state of competition in the ex ante auction.
But is that a sound principle? On the one hand, it is intuitively appealing to say that the patentee is not entitled to more
than the value of its invention; however, some of that appeal is
76. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 690–91 (referring to Case 2).
77. Thus, if there are multiple technologies and there is imperfect competition for one of the technologies (that is, at least two technologies that could
be used, but one is better than the other), the superior patentee captures a
part of the value of standardization. See id. at 691 (referring to Case 3). The
same is true when there is no competition.

2017]

THE VALUE OF THE STANDARD

1183

lost under the technical definition provided by the auction
model. We noted the ambiguity in the intuitive concept of the
value of the invention in our Scenario 1, and the auction model
resolved this ambiguity. But on the facts of Scenario 1, the value of the invention is zero under the implicit definition provided by auction model. This means that in Scenario 1, where
there was in fact a fragmented market pre-standardization, in
which patentee A charged $5 per user, after patentee A was
“lucky” enough to have its technology selected as the standard
the “fair and reasonable” royalty it would be entitled to charge
would drop to zero. Thus, while it seems intuitive to say that a
patentee should not be able to charge more than “the value of
the invention,” it does not seem quite so intuitive to say that
“the value of the invention,” and hence a fair royalty—which,
after all, should be fair to the patentee as well as the licensee—
should be zero in Scenario 1.
This counterintuitive result turns on the principle that the
patentee’s return should be constrained by ex ante competition.
Though the principle also seems very intuitive, we will argue
that it is unsound nonetheless, at least as embodied in the auction model. Ex ante competition is not desirable in and of itself,
after all; it is desirable only to the extent that it promotes static
and dynamic efficiency. We will argue that the auction model
wrongly conflates network value appropriation and sunk costs
holdup. An ex ante analysis is necessary to prevent sunk costs
holdup, which has adverse efficiency implications. But the auction aspect of the model, which avoids network value appropriation, is unnecessary in terms of static efficiency and unsound
in terms of dynamic efficiency.
B. STATIC EFFICIENCY
First off, it is important to recognize that network value
appropriation has no static efficiency implications, or at least
none beyond the implications of above marginal cost pricing
that is inherent in the patent system. The payment from the
user to the patentee is a mere transfer, as illustrated by the
contrast between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. In Scenario 2,
whether bargaining between the patentee and the users results
in a royalty of $10 per user, or $50 per user, or $100 per user,
the users will not choose another technology, avoid investing
altogether, or otherwise change their behavior, so long as the
royalty is less than $100. True, the conclusion that no user will
change her behavior is an artifact of our unrealistic assumption
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that all the users have identical demand functions. More realistically, some users will be priced out of the market at higher
royalty rates. But this is so whether there is a single patentee
charging what the market will bear for its invention (Scenario
2), or a post-standardization patentee armed with an injunction
(Scenario 1). The efficiency implications of allowing the successful patentee to capture some part of the market poststandardization are only those which are inherent in the above
marginal cost pricing that is essential to the patent system.
In contrast, it is well understood that sunk costs holdup
78
does have efficiency implications. A patentee with an injunction can extract some portions of the user’s sunk costs, in addition to the cost saving or profit boost accruing from the use of
the invention as compared with the best alternative. While that
immediate payment is only a transfer, the result of the payment is that an undertaking that would have been profitable
for the user if it had licensed ex ante may be less profitable or
even unprofitable if it has to license ex post. A transaction in
which sunk costs holdup is a possibility is, ex ante, riskier than
one in which it is not, all else being equal. The increased risk
will cause the user to entirely avoid at least some transactions
in which there is a possibility of sunk costs holdup occurring. In
contrast to network value appropriation, with sunk costs
holdup the amount the user is willing to pay ex ante is lower
than the amount that the user would have been willing to pay
ex post. It is that differential between ex post and ex ante value
to the user that causes the user to inefficiently change its behavior.
To summarize, the static efficiency implications of sunk
costs holdup and network value appropriation are very different, because with sunk costs holdup, the amount the user is
willing to pay ex post is higher than it would have been willing
79
to pay ex ante, while with network value appropriation the
amount that the user is willing to pay ex post is exactly the
same as it would have been willing to pay ex ante.
Swanson and Baumol specifically identify the allocative in80
efficiency implications of sunk costs incurred by users, but despite having identified the network effect as a mechanism giv78. See, e.g., Farrell et al., supra note 17, at 615 (explaining that users
may make inefficient investments to protect themselves from possible patent
holdups).
79. See supra note 42.
80. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 37.
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ing rise to holdup, they never specifically identify its efficiency
81
implications. By omission, they imply that the same rationale
applies to both phenomena, thus wrongly conflating sunk costs
holdup and network value appropriation. Any royalty that is
less than the incremental value to the user of the patented
technology, excluding sunk costs, will satisfy allocative efficiency, at least within the broad bounds inherent in the above marginal cost pricing that is essential to the patent system.
This means that a royalty based on the auction model is
not necessary for allocative efficiency. This may seem to be a
strong claim, given that Layne-Farrar et al. described the auc82
tion model as “rooted in the concept of economic efficiency,”
and given that Swanson and Baumol assert that the outcome of
the auction process and a license fee based on the efficient
83
component pricing rule “will normally be the same.” However,
efficient component pricing merely requires that the price that
a patentee implicitly charges to itself for the use of its IP,
which is the difference between the final product price and the
incremental price of the other inputs, is equal to the price the
patentee charges to licensees who are competing in the product
market. This is, as Swanson and Baumol argue, a reasonable
interpretation of the “nondiscriminatory” branch of the FRAND
84
85
requirement. The “efficient” aspect of ECPR is that if this
rule were not observed, a market might be captured by a manufacturer facing a lower IP cost (a licensee, or, more likely, the
patentee itself) even though it had a higher incremental cost of
other inputs, resulting in an inefficient use of non-IP resources.
However, this in itself says nothing about marginal cost pricing
of the IP. If the patentee charges itself an implicit price which
is greater than its marginal cost of using the IP—in order to recoup its R&D investment, as per standard patent theory—there
is nothing inefficient under ECPR about the patentee charging

81. Similarly, Farrell et al. correctly note that what we are referring to as
sunk costs holdup is undesirable because it causes the user to inefficiently
change its behavior. However, Farrell et al. then proceed to assert that what
we refer to as network value appropriation exacerbates holdup, without identifying how it gives rise to either static or dynamic inefficiency. Farrell et al.,
supra note 17, at 603–16.
82. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 685.
83. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 37–39; see also Layne-Farrar et
al., supra note 14, at 687 (making this point about Swanson & Baumol’s analysis).
84. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 37–39.
85. Id.
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the same above marginal cost price to licensees, because the
party with the lowest non-IP costs will still be able to capture
the market.
After elaborating on the nondiscriminatory aspect of
ECPR, with which we have no quarrel, Swanson and Baumol
then assert that the ECPR-determined license fee and the royalty emerging from the auction process “will normally be the
86
same.” But what they actually show is that the outcome of an
auction process, namely incremental cost pricing, also satisfies
87
the ECPR criterion. They do not show that any price which
satisfies ECPR will necessarily, or usually, be the outcome of
an auction process. Thus they do not show that the outcome of
88
the auction model and ECPR are “normally the same.” They
show only that the outcome of the auction model is one possible
royalty in the class of royalties that satisfies ECPR.
In summary, Swanson and Baumol never show that it is
inefficient to allow the patentee to capture part of the value of
standardization. Indeed, as we have seen, their auction model
does allow the patentee to capture the value of standardization
in some circumstances. Swanson and Baumol show that the
auction pricing mechanism is sufficient to avoid inefficiencies
associated with sunk costs and that it is nondiscriminatory, or
89
efficient, in the ECPR sense. But they do not show that the
auction model is necessary to avoid inefficiencies associated
with sunk costs or satisfy efficient component pricing. Moreover, while they identify network value appropriation as a
90
mechanism giving rise to holdup, they never specifically identify any inefficiencies associated with that mechanism. Nor are
we aware of any other scholarship that purports to demonstrate, rather than merely assert, that allowing the patentee to
86. Id.
87. See id. at 38, where Swanson & Baumol argue that when faced with
ample ex ante competition an IP owner cannot charge a price above marginal
cost, “at least if the technology owner is effectively constrained ex post by preselection commitments.” In effect, this assumption incorporates the auction
pricing model into the ECPR formula, with the result that the ECPR formula
reduces to an incremental cost royalty. However, the notion that the IP owner
is constrained by pre-selection commitments does not rest on any principle of
efficient component pricing, which requires only that the royalty charged by
the patentee to others is the same as the implicit price charged to itself. If that
assumption is relaxed, the link between ECPR and the auction model is broken.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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capture part of the value of standardization results in static inefficiency.
C. INCENTIVES TO INVENT / DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
Next, consider the effect of the auction model on patentee
behavior. The first point to note is that the auction model is
purely static; it does not consider dynamic effects on the incentive to innovate. This is what gives rise to the counterintuitive
result that the patentee in Scenario 1 is entitled to nothing, despite having invented a valuable technology.
Swanson and Baumol acknowledge this, noting that “we
91
would not expect ‘reasonable’ royalties to be equal to zero.”
But in their model, royalties will exceed zero only because of
what they describe as “a plethora of ongoing incremental costs”
related to the licensing of IP, which, “in addition to involving
costs of negotiation, contracting, accounting, monitoring, and
auditing, also frequently involves the costs of instruction, train92
ing, and 24-hour assistance.” These costs are no more than the
marginal costs of licensing and supporting, or at most improving, on the initial innovation. Thus, while Swanson and
Baumol present this as a dynamic model, it takes no account of
the investment needed to induce the invention in the first place.
Their model explicitly assumes that “all investments in R&D by
the patent holders already have been sunk and patent holders
do not anticipate incurring any future costs as a consequence of
93
licensing their patent.” They subsequently relax this assumption, but only by allowing for recurring costs, as just de94
scribed. A return for such ongoing costs alone is not sufficient
to provide an incentive to invent the technology which is sub95
ject to the ex ante auction in the first place. This is equally
explicit in the extension by Layne-Farrar et al., which assumes
91. Id. at 22.
92. Id. at 22 & n.64.
93. Id. at 23. Indeed, Swanson & Baumol explicitly acknowledge that
“[n]either the antitrust nor the patent laws deem it unreasonable for IP holders to seek to reap the returns that accrue ex post from the attainment of lawfully won monopoly or market power.” Id. at 11. They go on to assert that in
light of this limitation of antitrust and IP law, “private methods of control
must be relied on to attempt to achieve this goal.” Id. at 12. This argument
fails to recognize that by allowing patentees to assert lawfully won market
power, patent law provides the incentive to invent; it is a central feature of the
patent system, not a shortcoming that needs to be rectified.
94. Id. at 19.
95. See id. at 22.
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that the patented technologies exist at the time of the auction
and explicitly states that the patentee’s minimum return must
96
exceed “the incremental cost of licensing its technology.” So,
when there is perfect competition ex ante in the market for the
patented invention, as in Scenario 1, “the equilibrium royalty
rate of each component of the standard is given by the incre97
mental cost of licensing.”
Thus the premise of the auction model, that a fair return to
the patentee is equal to its marginal cost of licensing, is in conflict with the fundamental premise of the patent system, which
is that the recovery of incremental costs alone is not sufficient
to induce innovation. Swanson and Baumol’s response to the
objection that a reasonable royalty cannot be zero is to say that
incremental costs of licensing normally exceed zero. But this
misses the point. The (correct) intuition that a patentee’s return cannot be zero reflects the premise of the patent system
that marginal cost pricing is insufficient to induce innovation.
A royalty of zero is simply the most obvious example of margin98
al cost pricing. Swanson and Baumol address the intuition
that a reasonable royalty should not be zero without addressing
the substance underpinning that intuition, which is that marginal cost pricing does not provide sufficient incentive to in-

96. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 689–90.
97. Id. at 690. Similarly, Swanson & Baumol state, “As rival IP solutions
come closer and closer to being perfect substitutes . . . the competitive royalty
will approach c, the incremental cost of recurring innovation and licensing expenses.” Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19.
Layne-Farrar et al. do note one criticism of the auction model, that “efficiency-based rules, which treat competitive market outcomes—even monopolistic ones—as optimal and ignore issues of equity, cannot be counted on to
produce outcomes that are fair or reasonable.” Layne-Farrar et al., supra note
14. Our critique of Swanson & Baumol is very different; our objection is that
their efficiency-based approach considers only static efficiency, not dynamic
efficiency.
Kieff & Layne-Farrar make essentially the same point we do, noting that
“strict” interpretations of the incremental value rule, in which a patent holder
is entitled only to the incremental value of its invention over the best patented
alternative, “focus solely on the ex post problem,” and ignores the need to provide an incentive to invent. F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects from Different Approaches To Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent
Remedies and Standard-Setting Organizations, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1091,
1120 (2013).
98. Also, as a practical matter, it is far from clear that the patentee’s incremental costs of licensing are substantially above zero in the context of software-implemented inventions that are common in standards.
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99

vent. In fact, there is no good response to the substantive
point; the auction pricing model is simply inconsistent with the
principle that a FRAND royalty should provide an adequate incentive to invent. This also resolves the fairness puzzle we noted earlier: the result that the patentee gets a zero royalty in
Scenario 1 seems unfair because it is unfair. It is not only fair,
but necessary, to allow the patentee to recover more than its
marginal cost.
Finally, consider the effect of sunk costs holdup on patentee incentives. A disadvantage of the patent system from an innovation perspective is that by requiring above marginal cost
pricing as a means of allowing the patentee to recover its sunk
cost of invention, dissemination of the invention is restricted.
The offsetting advantage is that the patent system gives the
inventor high-powered incentives to pursue inventions which
are socially useful, because the more valuable the invention to
100
The incentive is highsociety, the larger the incentive.
powered because it is the inventor’s own money, not public
funds, which are at risk. It follows from this that the reward to
the patentee should not be greater than the value of the inven101
tion to society, or the incentive to invent will be too large. If
the patentee can extract some part of the user’s sunk costs, in
addition to the cost saving or profit increase provided by the
patented technology, the incentive to invent will be greater
than the costs saving or profit advantage provided by the in102
vention, and the patent incentive will be too great. Thus sunk
99. See Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, FRAND Commitments and EC
Competition Law: A Reply to Philippe Chappatte, 6 EUR. COMP. J. 129, 153
(2010) (making this point); Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 948 (2014) (same); Sidak, supra note 14, at 972,
976–77 (same). Sidak, however, also appears to equate network value appropriation with holdup. See Sidak, supra note 14, at 1022 (arguing that patentees should be able to recover positive “holdup value”). We resist this characterization.
100. See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 530 (2001) (arguing that because a “patent effectively harnesses the private information of the innovator
about the value of an innovation,” patent incentives may be better than prizes
“despite the deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing”); see also Benjamin N.
Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 999, 1016 (2014) (reviewing the debate and arguing that patents may also allow inventors to resist expropriation by sub-optimal government rewards).
101. See Roin, supra note 100, at 1031–32.
102. See id.
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costs holdup is dynamically inefficient as it results in excessive
incentives to invent.
In summary, sunk costs holdup has negative dynamic effects on both user and patentee incentives; it induces users to
avoid making socially valuable investments that might be subject to holdup, and it induces patentees to overinvest in patents
in order to capture user’s sunk costs. In contrast, network value
appropriation has no negative static or dynamic effects on user
incentives, and it has potentially positive dynamic effects on
patentee incentives. For this reason, it is an error to treat network value and sunk costs holdup as being similar in nature
and requiring the same response. Though both phenomena
might be described as species of “holdup” because they both enable patentees to extract more ex post than they could have extracted ex ante, the efficiency implications of the two phenomena are completely different.
D. LEGAL OBJECTION: AUCTION VERSUS NEGOTIATION
This brings us to our legal objection to the auction model.
The technical reason why the patentee in Scenario 1 ends up
with a zero royalty under the auction model is that the patentee will necessarily be bid down to its minimum willingness to
accept, namely its marginal cost, when it is bidding against another patentee with equally good technology. In contrast, the
general legal rule is that damages in the form of a reasonable
royalty are assessed by reference to a hypothetical negotiation,
not an auction. The difference is that in a hypothetical negotiation the royalty is usually assumed to involve some split in the
difference between the patentee’s marginal cost and the user’s
maximum willingness to pay, so that some part of the surplus
is captured by the patentee. A negotiation model—unlike the
auction model—allows pricing above marginal cost, and that is
what provides the incentive to innovate.
In response, one might argue that the auction model really
is necessary from a dynamic perspective. The patent incentive
must be commensurate with the value of the technology, and
the value of the technology is the cost saving or profit increase
103
as compared with the best alternative. If the alternative is

103. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d
1341, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Farrell et al., supra note 17, at 611 (“Economic
incentives generally work well when each person’s or firm’s reward for its actions is broadly commensurate with the incremental contribution of those ac-
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just as good as the patented technology, then the appropriate
reward to the patentee is zero. It is certainly not a principle of
the patent system that the patentee should get a reward which
covers its sunk cost of invention; on the contrary, what makes
patent incentives high-powered is precisely that the inventor
will lose money if the invention does not provide a sufficient
104
advantage as compared to the alternatives. The patentee
must not be rewarded for re-inventing the wheel. On this argument, it seems that the incremental ex ante approach is
sound because in Scenario 1 technology A is no better than
technology B, C, D, and so on, and because A has not added any
value over the alternatives, it should not be entitled to any reward.
In our view, this argument is entirely sound if the alternative is unpatented. In Scenario 1, if any of the alternative technologies are unpatented, then we entirely agree that a reasonable royalty for patentee A should be zero, for exactly the
reasons just discussed. This is consistent with established law.
Whether within the SEP context or otherwise, it is clear that
the royalty cannot exceed the incremental value of the invention over an unpatented alternative, because the unpatented
alternative determines the user’s maximum willingness to
105
pay.
However, the same is not true if the alternatives are patented, either as a matter of policy or as a matter of law. In the
standards context it is entirely plausible that in practice all the
relevant technologies will be patented, precisely because of the
incentive provided by the prospect of being included in the
106
The same problem may also arise outside the
standard.
standards context, and it is useful to consider how the problem
should be treated generally, before returning to the SEP context.
Outside the SEP context, the law is not clear as to how a
patented alternative should be treated; the limited case law intions to total economic surplus.”).
104. See, e.g., Geradin, supra note 99, at 948.
105. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 893 F. Supp.
1386, 1390–93 (N.D. Ind. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
106. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession:
Some Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and
the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1093–1110
(2014) (discussing the competition among patentees to have their technology
included in the standard).
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dicates that a patented alternative that is on the market should
be considered available at the established patented price, which
107
is normally above marginal cost. In contrast, the auction
model applied outside the SEP context implies that where the
alternative is patented, the infringing user in the hypothetical
negotiation should be imagined to play one patentee off against
another until the patentee is haggled down to its minimum
willingness to accept.
We are not aware of any literature providing a thorough
theoretical analysis of this problem, and the solution is not evident. There is no accepted theory of the portion of the surplus
that a single patentee should be able to claim as a matter of op108
timal incentives to innovate. The problem of the optimal royalty to a patentee in the face of competition from a patented alternative is even more difficult, and we are not going to solve it
here. It suffices to make three points, all of which turn on our
general criticism that the auction model ignores the problem of
the incentive to innovate which is at the heart of the patent
system.
First, whatever the optimal royalty in the face of a patented alternative, the marginal cost pricing implied by the auction
model is wrong from a dynamic perspective. The fact that two
patentees develop equivalent technology at the same time does
not mean that neither required the lure of a patent. Viagra and
Cialis may be equally effective in treating erectile dysfunction,
but that does not imply that they both would have been invent107. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308,
2013 WL 5593609, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (stating that the court would
consider patented alternatives, but “that they will not drive down the royalty
in the hypothetical negotiation by as much as technology in the public domain”).
108. While full appropriability of the social value of the invention by the
patentee is sometimes suggested as the appropriate baseline, the optimal return is probably less than full appropriability for a variety of reasons. See
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 100, at 535; see also YOCHAI BENKLER,
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 37–38 (2009); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 268–71 (2007) (discussing several positive
effects of spillovers); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 505, 529–31 (2010) (noting several negative effects of full
appropriability); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991)
(discussing two major downsides to using full social value as baseline); Carl
Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, 8 INNOVATION
POL’Y & ECON. 111, 114–17 (highlighting the negative effects of overrewarding patent holders).
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ed if pharmaceutical patents were not available. The auction
model implies that the reasonable royalty for a user of Viagra is
a few pennies, because in an auction a user could play Pfizer
against Lilly to drive the royalty down to marginal cost. But
when both alternatives are subject to a valid patent it must be
assumed that the patentees would not have invented their
technology unless they anticipated getting more than marginal
109
cost. If both patentees receive a zero royalty, or close to it,
whenever two or more equivalent technologies are invented,
then the expected return to either will be zero, which is clearly
insufficient to induce the invention in the first place.
Second, the patent system does not turn on the theoretical
return to the patentee in a bargaining model, or on the theoretically optimal return to the patentee from an incentive perspective. Rather, the amount that patentees have actually been
able to extract in real-world negotiations are the primary drivers of the patent system’s incentives. By the same token, courts
have rejected reliance on theoretical models that are not ade110
quately tied to the facts of the case. At least in the absence of
a generally accepted theoretical optimum, the benchmark return should be given by comparable actual negotiations. By the
same token, in the absence of evidence that, in the real world,
competition among competing patentees regularly results in
users bargaining both patentees down to their marginal cost, a
reasonable royalty should allow a patentee competing with a
patented alternative to recover some part of the surplus due to
its invention.
Further, there is no principled difference between the SEP
context and the general patent context which justifies an auction model in the former and a negotiation model in the latter.
The image of multiple patentees with different technologies
competing against one another for the prize of being made part
of the standard makes a model in which competition forces the
patentee down to its marginal cost seem plausible in the SEP
context. But even outside that context, when we are consider109. This accepts the substantive law as sound, and in particular that the
nonobviousness standard ensures that patents are granted only for inventions
which required the lure of a patent. We doubt this is true in practice, but we
consider it to be the appropriate assumption in the remedial context. See
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15, at 14 n.55.
110. See Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1331–34 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (rejecting an expert’s use of the Nash Bargaining Solution); Uniloc USA,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the
twenty-five percent rule of thumb).
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ing one patented technology that is substantially superior to an
unpatented alternative, it is still possible in principle that the
patentee will be haggled down to its incremental cost. Nevertheless, the law generally does not assume that the patentee
always will be haggled down to its minimum willingness to accept. For this reason, the auction model of SEPs is inconsistent
111
with the general law of reasonable royalty damages.
E. SHAPLEY PRICING
Up to this point, we have argued that the auction model
should be rejected as being unnecessary for static efficiency and
unsound in terms of providing adequate incentives to invent.
But are there any better alternatives?
One alternative that remedies some of the defects of the
112
auction model is Shapley pricing. As described by LayneFarrar et al., the Shapley value in the standard setting context
can be thought of as the outcome of a process in which:
[T]he patent owners arrive at the SSO in random order each with her
patent in her pocket, with all possible arrival sequences equally likely. Now suppose that in each sequence, each patent owner receives
the amount by which her patent increases the value of the best
standard that can be built from the patents that are already at the
SSO when she arrives. That is, if the set of patents S is at the SSO
when patent j arrives, j’s owner receives the incremental value v(Sj)
– v(S). The Shapley value gives j the average of such contributions
over all possible arrival sequences—each patent thus receives the av113
erage (over arrival sequences) of its marginal contribution.

111. Another difficulty with the auction model is that expected marginal
contribution may be different from the actual marginal contribution. For example, as explained in Microsoft, support for video interlacing is part of the
H.264 standard. Video interlacing was important for older technology but is
now largely obsolete and is required largely as legacy support. Microsoft Corp.
v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *21–22, *24 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). Suppose, however,
that at the time the standard was developed, no one anticipated the changeover from interlacing to progressive video. Support for interlacing might have
been considered valuable ex ante, yet, in fact, it is now used by few users. Under the incremental ex ante approach, a party with patents on key interlacing
technology might command a high royalty, even though the actual value of
that technology to users is low. By contrast, under the contingent ex ante approach that we describe in Part III, royalties will reflect the actual value of the
technology to the user.
112. Named after Lloyd S. Shapley, who introduced the concept. L.S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, in 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF
GAMES 307 (H.W. Kuhn & A.W. Tucker eds., 1953).
113. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 695; see, e.g., H.P. Young, Individual Contribution and Just Compensation, in THE SHAPLEY VALUE: ESSAYS
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That is, the return to any patentee is the expected amount
that its patent would contribute to the total value of the standard. So, in our Scenario 1, each of the ten patentees with equally good WLAN technology would be entitled to one tenth of the
value of the standard, or $5 per user. The intuition is that if A
were the first technology to arrive and was therefore selected
as the standard, it would then able to extract a royalty of $50
from each user. If B arrived next, it would add nothing to the
value of the standard, since A and B are purely alternatives, so
it would receive zero, as would all the others except A. But if B
happened to arrive first, it would receive $50, and A would receive nothing, as would all the others except B. The average
over these scenarios is the Shapley value. We will refer to the
approach proposed by Layne-Farrar et al. as “ex ante Shapley
pricing” because each patent owner whose technology might
have been included in the standard is entitled to a share, regardless of whether its particular technology is actually cho114
sen.
While Layne-Farrar et al. present Swanson and Baumol’s
auction models as efficiency-based, and Shapley pricing as
115
“just,” this is not entirely fair to Shapley pricing, which is
more efficient than auction pricing. It is true that Shapley value pricing is fair in an intuitive sense; for example, all the
technologies in Scenario 1 are equally good, and with Shapley
pricing, all patentees will get the same royalty.
But Shapley pricing is also efficient. Under Shapley pricing
the patentees do share in the value of standardization, as it is
an explicit premise of the Shapley approach that the patentees
are entitled to the same value that would be available to a sin116
gle patentee holding patents to all the relevant technologies.
IN HONOR OF LLOYD S. SHAPLEY 267 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1988) [hereinafter THE
SHAPLEY VALUE] (providing further discussion); see also MARTIN J. OSBORNE
& ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 291 (1994) (providing a sim-

ilar explanation). To date, however, Shapley pricing does not appear to have
received any attention in the case law.
114. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 695–96 (noting that in their
approach to Shapley pricing, patents that are not part of the ultimate standard will nonetheless receive non-zero value).
115. Id. at 693.
116. See id. at 694 (“The total value of the standard is distributed among
all patents; nothing is left over.”); THE SHAPLEY VALUE, supra note 113, at 269
(noting that a premise of Shapley value is that the output is “fully distributed”). The value of the standard is implicitly the amount that can actually be
charged by the standard owner, not the social value. So while the premise, as
described by Layne-Farrar et al., is that “[t]he total value of the standard is
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But as we have seen, this in itself does not have any adverse
implications for allocative efficiency. In terms of dynamic efficiency, the Shapley approach is in principle superior to the auction model. Because the value shared by the patentees is the
same as the value that could have been captured by a single
patentee, the expected return to potential inventors under
Shapley pricing is the same as that facing a single patentee
charging what the market can bear. As we have seen, this may
not be strictly optimal, but it is the appropriate benchmark.
Shapley pricing can also be implemented to avoid inefficiencies due to sunk costs holdup by defining the value of the
standard appropriately. It is established law that a reasonable
royalty to a single patentee must be assumed to be negotiated
ex ante, in order to avoid sunk costs holdup; by extension, the
value that the patentees share under Shapley pricing is that
value that could be extracted by a single patentee holding all
the relevant patents but prior to the users incurring any sunk
117
costs. If we define the value of the standard in this way, sunk
costs holdup is avoided, and Shapley pricing is just as good as
118
the auction model in terms of allocative efficiency.
Thus Shapley pricing is both fair and more efficient than
auction pricing. Ex ante Shapley pricing as described by LayneFarrar et al. does have one major drawback, however, which
means that in practice it will not be adequate from a dynamic
perspective. It achieves fairness by awarding a royalty to all

distributed among all patents,” this refers to the value of the standard that
can be extracted in licensing, not the overall social value. Layne-Farrar et al.,
supra note 14, at 694. The authors also state that Shapley pricing approach
“ignore[s] any market power that being included in a standard might bestow,”
but they go on to explain that “[t]he Shapley value method of distributing
rents bases payoffs on ex ante marginal contributions, so even IP that is not
part of the ‘winning’ standard receives some payoff, as long as its average
marginal contribution to some collections of patents is positive.” Id. at 701.
Thus, they do not dispute that the patentees as a whole capture some part of
the value of standardization, as does the particular patentee which is selected
to be part of the standard, which is our point. Shapley pricing ignores the value of being included in the standard only in the sense that patentees which
are not included in the standard will also share in the value of standardization.
117. We consider this to be an uncontroversial clarification of Shapley pricing. The Shapley model, even as explained by Layne-Farrar et al., is not explicit as to how the value of the standard is to be determined, as Shapley pricing is primarily concerned with how to split that value.
118. Because Shapley pricing results in above marginal cost pricing, some
users will be priced out of the market, but as discussed above, this is inherent
in the patent system generally.
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patentees whose technology might potentially have contributed
to the standard, even if the technology was not actually selected. As noted, in our example this means that all ten patentees
would be entitled to a royalty, even though only one was actually selected. The difficulty with using ex ante Shapley pricing as
the FRAND royalty is that as a matter of law only the patentee
who is actually selected is entitled to a royalty, because none of
the others will have their patent infringed. In Scenario 1, if A is
selected, and is entitled to a royalty based on its ex ante Shapley value, it will only get a royalty of $5, which means that the
expected return to all patentees will be only one-tenth of what
a single patentee would have received. In principle, the patentees collectively should be entitled to receive the same amount
as a single patentee. But in the real world, only a patentee
whose patent is actually infringed will be entitled to a recovery,
so in practice the actual aggregate return to the patentees
would be substantially less than what would be available to a
single patentee. This, in turn, implies that the expected return
to an inventor contemplating an investment in a standardized
technology would be correspondingly inadequate.
III. THE INCREMENTAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE
PATENT TO THE VALUE OF THE STANDARD TO THE
USER
In this Part, we argue for our alternative approach to calculating FRAND royalties, under which the royalty reflects the
incremental contribution of the patent in suit to the value of
the standard. As noted in the Introduction, this approach combines two elements which we view as mutually reinforcing:
first, a contingent ex ante framework which attempts to estimate the bargain that reasonable parties would have struck
prior to incurring sunk costs, but with full knowledge of all
relevant information that is revealed ex post (including the
patent’s inclusion in the chosen standard); and second, ex post
Shapley pricing, which allocates the aggregate royalties payable for the manufacture, sale, or use of standard-compliant
products in proportion to each patent’s ex post marginal contribution to the value of those products. Section A explains why
the contingent ex ante approach is preferable to the Swanson
and Baumol incremental ex ante approach, and Section B extends the framework to multiple SEPs. Section C then introduces ex post Shapley pricing, and Section D discusses the
practical implications of our proposal.
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A. THE CONTINGENT EX ANTE APPROACH
We propose that a better approach for setting FRAND royalties is to posit a contingent ex ante hypothetical negotiation,
119
coupled with what we will call “ex post” Shapley pricing. As
in Swanson and Baumol’s auction model, this approach assumes that royalties are set ex ante, that is, before users have
incurred any sunk costs, and thus avoids the problem of sunk
costs holdup. Our model differs from Swanson and Baumol’s,
however, in that it is a negotiation model rather than an auction model. This means that the patentee and the user split the
difference between the user’s maximum willingness to pay and
the patentee’s minimum willingness to accept, in contrast to
the auction model in which the patentee is bid down to its
minimum. Moreover, the characteristic feature of the contingent ex ante approach is that, while the hypothetical negotiation takes place ex ante, the parties are assumed to have all ex
post information; in particular, the parties are assumed to
120
know which technology was selected as the standard. Put another way, the hypothetical negotiation takes place ex ante, but
it is contingent on ex post information. This feature ensures an
adequate return to the patentees. The royalties are then apportioned among the patentees according to Shapley pricing. However, rather than apportioning the royalties among all those
patentees who might have been selected for the standard, as in
the Shapley pricing model discussed by Layne-Farrar et al., our
approach apportions the royalties only among patents that ac-

119. The contingent ex ante model was originally proposed by Mario
Mariniello. Mario Mariniello, Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
(FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for Competition Authorities, 7 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 523, 526 (2011) (“[T]he licensing terms offered after the adoption of the
standard (ex-post) should not be worse than those which the patent holder
would have committed to ex-ante in the context of a standard setting contest
conditional on the information that is available ex-post.”). We further developed it in a recent article. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15.
120. More precisely, the fundamental principle is that the parties negotiate
with ex post knowledge, which, in an infringement action, normally means
that they will know whether the patents in question are essential. Note, however, that in Microsoft, whether the patents were in fact essential had not
been established, because the action was not one for infringement, but rather
for breach of contract premised on Motorola’s alleged failure to abide by its
FRAND commitment. The court correctly held that, under these circumstances, a reasonable rate would be discounted to allow for the probability that the
patents at issue were not in fact essential to the standard. See Microsoft v.
Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *53 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25,
2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
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tually are selected for inclusion in the standard. For this reason, we refer to it as ex post Shapley pricing, in contrast with
the ex ante Shapley pricing described by Layne-Farrar et al. Ex
post Shapley pricing implements the apportionment principle.
The simplest way to understand our approach is to imagine
a three-step process. In the first step, the SSO decides on the
standard, including the patented technologies to be incorporated into the standard. In contrast to the incremental ex ante
approach, users have no direct input at this stage (though the
interests of the users will be taken into account by the SSO,
which attempts to develop a standard that the users will find
valuable). In the second stage, the SSO negotiates a royalty for
the standard with the users before the users have invested any
sunk costs in reliance on the standard. In the negotiation process, the users do not have the option of adopting another standard incorporating different patented technology, but if a standard can be adopted with unpatented technology, that option
can be taken into account. This means that the users cannot
use the threat of switching to a standard based on patented
technology B as bargaining leverage, though they can use the
threat of switching to a non-standard technology B, or to a
standard based on unpatented technology. In the third stage,
after the royalty is negotiated, the SSO divides the royalty
among the successful patentees by applying Shapley pricing to
the technologies which were actually selected. (Note that this
three-stage process does not strictly reflect our approach—some
technical refinements are discussed in Appendix B—but it illustrates its main points. Neither this model nor the more detailed model set out in the Appendix are intended to describe
how we think a real world royalty setting process should work.
Rather, they are conceptual benchmarks for assessing a
FRAND royalty, in the same spirit as Swanson & Baumol’s
model.)
Two points about the contingent ex ante approach deserve
emphasis. First, because the negotiation takes place before the
standard is adopted, the patentees whose technologies are
adopted cannot capture any of the users’ sunk costs. This
avoids any inefficiencies associated with sunk costs holdup.
Second, the expected returns to inventors seeking to develop
technology that will become part of the standard will be the
same as the expected return to a single patentee seeking to develop that technology in the absence of competition. In other
words, it does not matter whether the standard develops
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through a formal standard setting process or emerges as a de
facto standard; the reasonable royalty will be the same in either case. As explained in the context of Shapley pricing, we
view this as the appropriate benchmark in terms of providing
an incentive to invent. Conversely, from the perspective of the
user, the contingent ex ante approach is neutral amongst the
various possible reasons why the technology at issue is valuable to the user.
Thus, to return to our motivating examples, the result of
the contingent ex ante hypothetical negotiation in Scenario 1
would be exactly the same as the result of an actual negotiation
in Scenario 2B. In Scenario 2B, the users are willing to pay up
to $100 to use technology A, because it is a standard (de facto).
Under the contingent ex ante approach to Scenario 1, the users
would likewise be willing to pay up to $100 to use technology A,
because it is a standard (as a result of the formal selection
process). In both Scenarios 1 and 2B, the patentee’s minimum
willingness to accept is its marginal cost (which is zero in our
examples) and each user’s next-best alternative is a nonstandard WLAN technology worth $10 (which each can license
121
for $5). If the parties have the same bargaining power in both
122
Scenarios, the royalty will be exactly the same in either case.
The exact share that will be captured by the patentee in a bargaining model is indeterminate, but in our view that is not a
123
flaw in our model. It is a reflection of the reality that there is
no good descriptive model of the amount patentees actually receive in licensing negotiations. As discussed above, a full theo121. In Scenario 1, that alternative would be one of the technologies that
might have been, but was not, included in the standard, while in Scenario 2B
it is one of the technologies that did not become a de facto standard because it
emerged after A.
122. In Scenario 2, where there is only one WLAN technology, the users’
alternative is to use the pre-WLAN alternatives, such as telephones and wired
internet, which are defined to be worth zero, and so on a standard Nash Bargaining Solution the patentee’s royalty would be slightly higher than in Scenario 1. Nonetheless, the principle is that the royalty does not depend on how
the standard emerges; Scenario 1 is functionally different from Scenario 2 in
terms of the alternatives available to the users, but functionally the same as
Scenario 2B. We should emphasize that a Nash Bargaining Model is not a part
of the contingent ex ante approach. Our basic point is that it is a bargaining
model, as opposed to an auction model, which means that the patentee and the
users will split the surplus.
123. For a contrary view, see Roger D. Blair & Thomas Knight, Problems in
Sharing the Surplus, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95 (2013) (objecting to bargaining models in the SEP context on the basis that the split in the surplus is
arbitrary and an arbitrary royalty cannot be reasonable).
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retical bargaining model would incorporate considerations of
the optimal return to patentees from an incentive perspective.
The case law, on the other hand, attempts to answer this question from an empirical perspective, by looking for the returns
on comparable licenses. For our purposes, it is enough to say
that a bargaining model, not an auction model, is appropriate
in the SEP context, just as it is appropriate in the context of
reasonable royalty damages generally.
Before turning to the question of apportioning the royalty
among the many patented technologies making up the standard, we will consider some objections to our model that can be
assessed in the context of the simple single technology standard. The most important of these is that, while the patentee
whose technology is adopted cannot capture any of the users’
sunk costs, it is able to capture some substantial part of the
value of standardization. This seems contrary to the principle
that the patentee is entitled to capture the value of its technology, but not the value of standardization. We have two responses to this objection, or more precisely two different ways
of framing the same response.
One response is to say that, if the principle that the patentee is not entitled to capture any of the value of standardization is understood as meaning that the royalty available to the
patentee should be capped by its incremental ex ante value as
in the auction model, then that principle is simply wrong. As
124
discussed in our critique of the auction model in Part II, the
incremental ex ante model does not provide an adequate incentive to invent, whereas the contingent ex ante approach provides an appropriate incentive to invent without any allocative
inefficiency (apart from the possibility of some users being
priced out of the market, which is an implication of the patent
system generally).
But we need not reject the principle that the patentee is
entitled to capture only the value of the technology, so long as
that value is properly defined. The cases establishing this principle do not provide a precise definition of “the value of the
technology,” perhaps on the assumption that the term is selfevident. But as discussed above, even in the very simple example illustrated by Scenario 1 it is not at all intuitive what constitutes the value of the technology; is it the $500 that patentee
A was in fact receiving annually prior to standardization, or the
124. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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consumer surplus of its customers ($1000 in our example), or
the full value of the market to all patentees prior to standardization ($5000), or even the full social prior to standardization
($10,000)? Or it is zero, as Swanson and Baumol’s auction
model would have it? Certainly it seems strongly counterintuitive to say that the value of the technology was zero, given
that the patent was actually licensed for $500 before standardization, and the value of the market dependent on the technology is $100,000.
In our view, “the value of the technology” is simply the
value of the technology to users; or more precisely, the value of
the functionality provided by the patented technology, as compared with the next best unpatented alternative, excluding any
amount that can be extracted because of sunk costs expended
125
by the user in reliance on that technology. It is the technology
126
itself that is being valued, not the patent. This is why the
contingent ex ante approach gives the same result in Scenarios
1 and 2. The value of WLAN to the user is the same whether
the technology emerges from a formal standard setting process
or a de facto process; the value of WLAN to the users is the
same whether there is only one technology capable of providing
that functionality, or many technologies.
Further, our analysis suggests that there is no such thing
as “the value of standardization” distinct from the value of the
technology. Consider, for example, a communications technology that is valueless unless at least two people are using it.
Should we say that the value of the first telephone was zero because it was useless until there were two? But when there were
two telephones, was the value of those telephones attributable
to the telephone technology or to the fact that they were
shared? To be sure, the value of a communications technology
does rise more than proportionately as the number of users increases (which is what gives rise to network effects). But it is
conceptually impossible to separate the contribution of the
technology and the contribution of the network effects, unless
we say that the value of the technology is the value when there

125. Put another way, the key meaning of the “value of the technology” is
that the patentee should not be able to capture any part of the users’ sunk
cost. As we have noted, standardization is often accompanied by sunk costs,
and in our view the principle that the patentee cannot capture any of the value of standardization is sound to the extent that it means that the patentee
cannot capture any of the users’ sunk costs.
126. See Taylor, supra note 16.
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are no network effects at all—which is to say, zero. Other than
that, we cannot say that the natural value of the technology is
the value of the network when there are two users, or 100 or
1,000,000; the numbers are arbitrary. Moreover, while it may
seem natural to say that the value of standardization is the
value that arises after the standard is adopted, this understanding is arbitrary too, because it suggests that the value of
the technology is different depending on whether the standard
happened to be adopted when there were 100 users or
1,000,000. But the particular time of standardization is happenstance. If a patentee cannot capture any more value than
inhered in the technology prior to adoption of the standard,
then all patentees would want to delay the standardization
127
process in order to maximize the returns to patentees. This is
clearly undesirable.
More generally, our analysis treats all sources of value
neutrally. Whether the value of the technology is due to network effects, to effects which scale linearly (such as per-unit
production cost savings), or to idiosyncratic factors does not affect the royalty the user should pay. This principle of value
neutrality is sound. To illustrate, suppose a patented invention
which causes LEDs implanted in running shoes to flash synchronously with dance music is worth $100 million to users because it becomes a fashion craze after being featured in a music
video. It is uncontroversial that the patentee in that case is entitled to capture a share of the full $100 million. Now suppose
that another invention enables a substantial increase in WLAN
network speeds and is also worth $100 million to users after it
is adopted as a standard. Suppose further that the value arising on standardization due to network effects, however that
might be defined, is $90 million. If the patentee in the second
example is entitled only to a share of the $10 million, on the
view that it is not entitled to capture any value of standardization, there will be a substantially greater incentive to invent
technologies like flashing shoes rather than enhanced WLAN,
even though the social value is the same in either case. In our
view, the patent system should not discriminate between inventions depending on the source of their value to users, but if
127. If the patentees cannot capture any of the value arising ex post, collectively they would prefer to have the standard arise de facto. No individual patentee would be sure that its technology would prevail, but the aggregate return would be higher if the standard developed later and thus the expected
value to any patentee would be increased by delay.
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there is an argument to be made for discrimination on that basis, surely network effects are not a source of value that should
be particularly disfavored.
In our approach, by contrast, the value of the technology is
simply equal to its value to the users, whether the technology
happens to be one in which the value grows more or less linearly with the number of users, as with pharmaceuticals, or disproportionately with the number of users, as with communications technology. (Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between
technologies which show network effects and those which do
not, as many, perhaps most technologies display network ef128
fects to some degree.) And while the users cannot play off one
patented technology against another, they can threaten to go to
an unpatented standard as leverage in the bargaining process.
This means that the value of the technology is capped by the
difference in the value to the user and the value of the best unpatented alternative. For example, suppose that as in Scenario
1, the market is mature but fragmented. There are nine firms
that have developed and patented WLAN technology, A, B, . . .
I, but the tenth technology J, is unpatented. These technologies
are all equally good. Even if the SSO selected technology A as
the standard, in the ex ante negotiation the users would be able
to threaten to adopt the unpatented technology J, which means
that A will get a royalty of zero. This is intuitively sound, given
that A is no better than the unpatented alternative. More generally, the value of the technology that is adopted as the standard is no more than the value as compared with the best unpatented alternative standard.
Consequently, under our approach a FRAND royalty is
treated in exactly the same manner as any other reasonable roy129
alty. Our concept of the value of the technology in the FRAND
context is exactly the same as the standard definition of the
value of the technology outside the FRAND context, which is to
say it is the difference between the value to the user of the
130
technology and the next best unpatented alternative. Our ap-

128. For example, a particular car model becomes more valuable as more
people own it, because parts are more easily available; a drug will become
more valuable as more people take it because prescribing physicians will become more familiar with its effects; and so on.
129. See note 119 and accompanying text. In this respect we agree with
Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 55.
130. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d
1341, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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proach therefore can be directly applied to any reasonable royalty scenario, and it simply reduces to a simpler model as the
circumstances require.
A second possible objection to our contingent ex ante bargaining model is that it is unfair, inasmuch as all of the ten
patentees had exactly equivalent technologies, and A’s selection
was more or less arbitrary. In our model, A is the only patentee
to share in the surplus; the others get no return on their inventions, which were just as valuable as A’s except for the happenstance of not being chosen. This point seems to underpin the intuition that a patentee should only be entitled to the value of
131
its invention and not the value of standardization.
We concede that, by awarding the entire value of standardization to A, even though A was selected arbitrarily, the
contingent ex ante approach might seem to abandon the fairness that is an attractive feature of ex ante Shapley pricing.
The difference between ex ante Shapley pricing and the contingent ex ante approach in this respect is that under the contingent ex ante approach the entire expected return will be realized by the patentee whose technology is selected, whereas
under ex ante Shapley pricing it would be split between the
successful patentee and unsuccessful patentees who will never
be able to bring a claim. Even so, the contingent ex ante approach is fair to patentees on average (if not in individual
cases), and it is certainly more fair to patentees than Swanson
and Baumol’s auction model. And our approach is no more unfair than the patent system generally. In our Scenario 2, for example, technology A captured the entire market because it was
developed first. If B through J were developing their inventions
at the same time, and just happened to be slightly later to
market, the incremental value of A’s contribution is only the
slightly earlier date of development, and not the entire value of
the WLAN market. Yet A will uncontroversially be able to cap132
ture the entire value of the market, simply by virtue of hav131. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 685 (“Common sense
suggests that it cannot be ‘fair,’ ‘reasonable,’ or ‘non-discriminatory’ to offer
the holder of easily substitutable patents the same compensation as the holder
of a critical, irreplaceable patented technology supporting the same standard.”). For other objections, see George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust
Law To Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 913, 919–20 (2011) (arguing, among other things, that ex post events are
unanticipated and therefore not relevant to incentives). We address this issue
in Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15, at 29–30.
132. By this we mean the $50,000, not the full social value of $100,000.
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ing been first. When a de facto standard emerges because of the
first-to-market advantage, the advantage gained by being incrementally first is almost as unfair as the advantage gained by
being selected by an SSO, yet this is not thought to be an objection to the ordinary operation of the patent system.
Two further issues deserve comment. First, under our approach it is possible that the return to any individual patentee
may be less than the cost of the invention, even if the value of
the WLAN technology is greater than the aggregate cost of invention, simply because a patentee whose invention is not incorporated into the standard may not receive any royalty at all.
But we do not view this as an objection to our approach; rather,
it is simply a reflection of the patent race problem that may
133
arise in any area of patent law. In many fields, such as
pharmaceuticals, roughly similar solutions to the same problem
may be patented at approximately the same time, and consequently they will share a market that otherwise might have
gone to just one of them. The problem is exactly the same
whether there are network effects, so that one of the alternatives takes a large share of the market and the others get none,
or when there are no network effects, so that all the alternatives take a smaller share of the overall market. In either case,
the expected return to the patentees is less than it would be in
the absence of simultaneous invention, and in either case the
simultaneous invention arises for the same reason, namely that
many different inventors perceive the same need and provide
an innovative solution. While this may well be a problem for
innovation, it is not one which a theory of SEP royalties needs
to address. In any event, our contingent ex ante approach, under which the patentee gets some part of the value of standardization, is surely better from this perspective than the auction approach, in which even the winning patentee gets
nothing.
Second, unlike the auction model, the contingent ex ante
approach does not provide any precise number for the reason133. In principle, a patent race could dissipate the entire patentee surplus,
though in reality the effects of patent races may be more complex. See Mark A.
Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 749–60 (2012)
(discussing the literature and arguing that patent races “may have gotten a
bad rap”). More generally, the contingent ex ante model does not guarantee
the patentee a sufficient return to cover its costs of invention. We do not view
this as a shortcoming of the approach; this is a characteristic of reasonable
royalty damages generally and it is this fact which makes the patent incentive
high-powered.
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able royalty, even in theory. The hypothetical negotiation splits
the surplus between the parties and thus leaves the outcome of
the negotiation to the theoretical black box of bargaining power
(or, in practice, to any evidence of bargaining power and comparable licenses in the particular field). Again, though, we do
not view this as a shortcoming of the model. There is no good
general model of the optimal return to a patentee, and our
model, like the hypothetical negotiation in reasonable royalties
generally, is agnostic on that point. This agnosticism is preferable to the auction model, which does provide a clear outcome,
but one which is clearly inefficient from a dynamic perspective.
And because the contingent ex ante model is applicable to reasonable royalties generally, if a general model of optimal royalties ever were to become accepted, under our model it would be
directly applicable in the SEP context as well.
B. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE SEPS
Two additional issues arise when a standard requires multiple patents for its implementation. One is the well-known
problem of royalty stacking, which requires that the overall
134
royalty for the standard not be excessive. The second is how
to allocate royalties among the essential patents, a matter we
135
referred to above as the apportionment problem. Apropos of
this second issue, the emerging FRAND case law recognizes
that “a patent that is extremely important and central to the
standard would reasonably command a higher royalty rate
136
than a less important patent.” In this Section, we show that
the contingent ex ante approach addresses the problem of royalty stacking, and when supplemented with ex post Shapley
pricing, it also resolves the apportionment problem. In contrast,
the incremental ex ante approach, as it turns out, is inconsistent with the proportionality principle.
Extending the contingent ex ante approach to multiple
patents is straightforward. In our three-step approach, by way
of illustration, the user is assumed to bargain with the SSO for
the right to use the standard. But since the user values the
standard as a whole rather than the individual patents, this
step is the same whether the standard requires one patent or

134. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 7, 20 and accompanying text.
136. Microsoft v. Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
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many. In other words, whether the functionality is implemented by one patent or many is irrelevant to the value of that
technology to the user, and it is therefore irrelevant to the royalty that will be paid by the user in the negotiations with the
SSO. This in itself eliminates the problem of royalty stacking,
137
both in terms of Cournot complements and in the more general sense of excessive royalties arising from multiple licenses.
Under the contingent ex ante approach, the patentees jointly
will receive, and the user will pay, exactly the same amount as
if the standard was implemented by a single technology held by
a single patentee.
More generally, the royalty that a single patentee who had
developed all the relevant technology would receive as the result of a contingent ex ante negotiation is the appropriate
benchmark for a FRAND royalty for a standard involving multiple patentees. The value of the functionality to the user is the
same whether that functionality is implemented by one patented technology or by multiple patented technologies. The total return to the patentees should also be the same either way:
otherwise, patentees would have an incentive to implement the
standard in a way that requires multiple technologies rather
than one, in order to claim a larger share of the value of the
functionality. Consequently, we take it as a fundamental principle that the overall royalty should not depend on the number
of patents.
The equivalency with a negotiation with a single patentee
also satisfies both the principle that the royalty should provide
an adequate incentive to invent (i.e., that the royalty should be
commensurate with the value of the invention) and that it
should balance widespread adoption of the standard against a
138
reasonable return to the patentees. Under the contingent ex
ante approach, the total royalties payable for use of any standard are proportionate to the standard’s social value. Moreover,
the total royalty paid by the user will be the same whether the
standard is a de facto standard with a single patent being held
by a single patentee, multiple patents held by a single patentee, or a standard set by an SSO with multiple patentees.
The reward to the patentees as a group—whether that group
consists of one or many individuals—depends only on the value
of the standard to the user. This ensures that the reward for

137. See supra note 5.
138. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
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developing the technology used to implement the standard is
the same regardless of how exactly it is developed. This also
contrasts with the incremental ex ante approach, under which
the royalty depends not only on the value of the technology to
the user, but also on the state of ex ante competition. Thus, if
competition were fierce in respect of a crucial aspect of a standard, and tame in respect of an aspect of that standard which
added little value, under the incremental ex ante approach the
total royalty for the latter could easily be more than for the
former, in violation of the proportionality principle.
The royalty received by the single patentee under the contingent ex ante approach also balances the need for widespread
adoption of the standard against a reasonable return to the
patentee. In bargaining, a single patentee will take into account the fact that a lower royalty will result in more widespread adoption of the patent, and thus a larger overall surplus
available to be split, while trading this off against the fact that
the widest adoption would require a zero return to the patentee
139
(unless perfect price discrimination is possible). The contingent ex ante bargain therefore will result in a royalty which encourages the widest adoption of the standard consistent with a
reasonable return to the patentee; and for this reason, the royalty stacking problem disappears. The Cournot complements
problem arises when multiple patentees (or input providers
more generally) do not take into account the externality in the
form of reduced sales which their royalty imposes on other in140
put providers. The assumption that the user negotiates with
the SSO for a single royalty, as it would with a single patentee
holding all the relevant patents (whether that is one or many),
solves this problem.
C. EX POST SHAPLEY PRICING
The next issue to consider is how to divide the royalty
among the patentees. Although the contingent ex ante model is
consistent with a variety of approaches, ideally the division of

139. In general, a monopolist will maximize profits by trading off higher
prices for lower quantities sold, until marginal cost equates marginal revenue.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 332–33 (9th ed.
2014).
140. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses,
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119–50 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (providing a general version of
Cournot’s theory of complements cast in terms of blocking patents).
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royalties should respect the proportionality principle—the idea
that a patent more important to the standard receives a higher
royalty than one that is less important—because this principle
better serves the goal of dynamic efficiency. In this Section, we
will argue that the contingent ex ante approach, combined with
what we will call ex post Shapley pricing, respects the proportionality principle in a way that is both intuitively and theoretically appealing.
As discussed above, under Shapley pricing as applied to
the standard setting context by Layne-Farrar et al., “the patent
owners arrive at the SSO” in random order, and the Shapley
value of a particular patent is its average marginal contribu141
tion over all possible arrival sequences. We referred to this as
ex ante Shapley pricing, as the Shapley value is determined before the patents are actually selected to be included in the
standard: every patentee whose technology might have been selected is entitled to a royalty. In ex post Shapley pricing, by
contrast, rather than considering the contribution of all patentees whose technology might have been selected to implement
the standard, we apply Shapley pricing to all patentees whose
technology actually was selected to implement the standard. In
the simple example discussed earlier, the problem is captured
by assuming that a standard consists of two complementary
functionalities, A and B. The components are strict complements, which is to say that the standard is worthless unless
142
both components are present. In Case 1, assume that there is
perfect competition ex ante for both components. That is, there
are multiple patented technologies A1, A2, etc., which could
provide functionality A, and multiple patented technologies B1,
B2, etc., which could provide functionality B. Two of these, A1
and B1, are selected by the SSO to be part of the standard.
Each user is willing to pay $200 for the operational standard,
and with equal bargaining power each pays $100. If A1 arrives
first, the standard is not operational and no user will be willing
to pay anything. If B1 then arrives, a functional standard can
be implemented and the value to be split between the patentees
is $100. A1’s marginal contribution is zero, and B1’s marginal
contribution is $100. But if B1 arrives first, the results will be
exactly the opposite. Therefore, the two patentees will share

141. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
142. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 689.
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the available royalties equally, which is to say $50. This
seems intuitively reasonable, given that the standard is not operational without both.
Now consider a standard in which the patents are not
strictly complementary. Not all patents which are “essential” to
a standard are necessarily strictly complementary, in the sense
that a valuable standard could not be implemented at all without them. Most obviously, patents which are necessary to implement an optional part of a standard are nonetheless consid144
ered essential, at least under the IEEE-SA Bylaws. More
importantly, even patents that are required to implement a
mandatory part of the standard are not necessarily strictly
145
complementary. For example, in a WLAN standard a particular technology might be required to implement a highthroughput protocol which is mandatory for an advanced standard. Even if the particular standard itself cannot be implemented without that technology, and even assuming that there
are no alternatives to the patented high-throughput technology,
an operable and commercially useful standard can be implemented without the higher throughput capability, though the
standard with the high-throughput technology is more valuable
than one without it. The question is how to allocate the value of
the standard as a whole between the various technologies. For
example, consider a stylized WLAN standard in which technology A is required for the basic transmission function, while
technology B provides advanced security. A WLAN standard
could be implemented using technology A alone, but B is use-

143. Compare with the incremental ex ante approach, in which each patentee would receive $0 in this scenario; and ex ante Shapley pricing, in which
each patentee would receive $50/N, where N is the number of functionally
equivalent patented technologies which might have been incorporated in the
standard.
144. See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. &
ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/
sb_bylaws.pdf.
145. Patents that are all essential to a mandatory part of a standard are
complementary in the sense that a compliant implementation of the standard
is impossible without using (or infringing) the patented technology. We will
refer to this as “legal” complementarity, in contrast to the “technical” complementarity which arises when there are superadditive effects from using two
technologies in tandem. Our discussion in the text refers solely to technical
complementarity, on the view that the reasonable royalty should reflect the
value of the standard to the user, and the value to the user lies in the technical functionality of the standard. See Taylor, supra note 16 (emphasizing
that the royalty should reflect the technology).
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less without A. Each user would be willing to pay $100 for a
standard implemented with technology A alone, and $120 for
the standard with the additional security provided by technology B. By the same methodology, the royalties would be $110 to
146
A1 and $10 to B1. The intuition is that A1 is entitled to more
than $100 because it supplies all of the value derived from the
transmission function alone ($100), and some of the value derived from the security function, which is worthless without the
transmission function.
In principle ex post Shapley pricing can easily be extended
to any combination of patents. For example, if two strictly complementary technologies, A and B, are required to implement
the transmission function, and one technology C, is required for
the security functionality, the royalties would be A1 = $56.67;
B1 = $56.67; C1 = $6.67. If two complementary technologies, C
and D, are required to implement the security functionality, the
royalties would be: A1 = $55; B1 = $55; C1 = $5; D1 $5. If one
technology, A, is required to implement the transmission function, and three complementary technologies, B, C, and D are
required for the security functionality, the royalties would be
A1 = $105; B1 = $5; C1 = $5; D1 = $5. If three complementary
technologies, A, B, and C are required to implement the transmission function, and one technology, D is required for the security functionality, the royalties would be A1 = $38.33; B1 =
$38.33; C1 = $38.33; D1 = $5.
Ex post Shapley pricing therefore satisfies the proportionality principle in an intuitively reasonable way. No doubt there
are other possible mechanisms for dividing the total value received by the patentee which would also satisfy the proportionality principle, though Shapley pricing also has a number of
147
characteristics which make it particularly attractive. These
examples at least show that a principled method of dividing the
royalties which satisfies the proportionality principle is theoretically possible.
Ex post Shapley pricing contrasts with several other possible methods for dividing the royalties that clearly do not satisfy
proportionality. Some patent pools, for example, simply allocate
royalties to each patentee according to the number of patents it

146. Arrival order (A1, B1) = $100 A1, $20 B1; (B1, A1) = $0 B1, $120 A1:
average is A1 = $110, B1 = $10.
147. See infra Appendix A.
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holds. This method, which we refer to as numeric proportionality, has the practical advantage of simplicity (and may well
be justified for that reason in some circumstances), but it
clearly does not satisfy proportionality in the sense we are using that term.
Nor does incremental ex ante pricing satisfy the proportionality principle, because the royalty received under the latter is determined by whether there are alternatives ex ante, not
by the importance of the technology. Thus, as we have seen, a
key technology with several alternatives may get a zero return,
while a secondary technology with few alternatives may receive
a high return. To illustrate, in our WLAN example if only one
technology is needed to implement the transmission functionality and one to implement the security functionality, under
Shapley pricing the technology actually used for transmission
(A1) would receive a royalty of $110, while the technology used
for security (B1) would receive $10, regardless of how many
technologies were competing ex ante. By contrast, under the incremental ex ante approach, the royalties will depend on the
number of technologies available ex ante. If there are three
equally good alternative technologies (A1, A2, and A3) available
ex ante which could be used to implement the transmission
functionality, but only one (B1) available to implement the security functionality, the royalty payable to A1 will be $0, and to
B1 $120. This result clearly would not be consistent with the
149
proportionality requirement —and in general, neither would
ex ante Shapley pricing, because the royalty for an important
technology will be diluted if there were many equivalents ex
ante.
Finally, we note that the most straightforward implementation of the contingent ex ante method will also apportion the
royalties according to the value of the technology to each user,

148. See, e.g., John M. Browning & Carla S. Mulhern, Licensing in the
Presence of Technology Standards, LICENSING J., Aug. 2009, at 18, 26–27.
Sidak asserts that applying Shapley pricing to SEPs would necessarily result
in numeric proportionality because all SEPs are by definition essential. See
Sidak, supra note 14, at 1043–44. But, this misses the point that a valuable
standard could be created without every patent that is essential to the chosen
standard. Users sometimes have little if any use for some SEPs, as was true
for the video interlacing feature of H.264.
149. An analogous proposal was specifically rejected by Judge Robart in
Microsoft as being an attempt by Motorola to extract the value of the standard. See Microsoft v. Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *44
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
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not just its value to the standard. This is consistent with the
150
case law. We have generally left open the question of whether
the SSO is assumed to bargain with each user individually or
with users as a group. The easiest and correct approach, which
151
is also consistent with the case law, is to imagine that each
individual user bargains with the SSO for the right to use the
standard, contingent on the standard having been adopted and
in the knowledge that other users will therefore also adopt the
standard. A user who values the standard more will be willing
to pay more for it. Further, a user who values particular aspects of the standard more or less will pay more or less for
those aspects. For example, suppose there are two users, X and
Y. Both value the basic transmission capability of a standardized WLAN at $100, but X would be willing to pay $140 for a
standard that also includes the security feature, while the security feature is worthless to Y, who would only pay $100 for
the right to use the standard, whether or not it has the security
functionality. Even though both are licensing the entire standard, under the contingent ex ante approach, X would have to
pay $140 in royalties for the standard and Y would have to pay
only $100 for the same standard. Further, if we add ex post
Shapley pricing, the return to each patentee will reflect the importance of the patent both to the particular user and to the
technology as a whole. If B brought an action against X, a reasonable royalty using the contingent ex ante method with ex
post Shapley pricing would be $20, but if B brought an action
152
against Y, the reasonable royalty would be zero.
This approach also automatically satisfies the apportionment principle that the royalty should reflect the value of the
technology to the standard, since the value to the standard is
153
simply the aggregate of the value to the individual users. In
contrast, the incremental ex ante approach is generally not
consistent with the apportionment principle. It would be possible to apply that approach on a user by user basis, but the

150. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20, *42.
151. See, e.g., Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20 (holding that the royalty
must reflect the value of the technology to the particular user); id. at *47–49
(noting that the technology at issue was of minimal importance to Microsoft’s
products).
152. The FRAND royalty payable by X to A would be $120 and by Y to A
would be $100.
153. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *6.
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value of each patent embodied in the standard is determined by
the state of ex ante competition, not on the value of the standard to a particular user. Suppose, for example, that there was
perfect competition ex ante in the market for component A, and
none for component B. If B brought an action against X, a reasonable royalty using the incremental ex ante approach would
be $140. If B brought an action against Y the reasonable royalty would be zero, because even though there is no competition
for that component, its incremental ex ante value is nonethe154
less zero so far as Y is concerned. Conversely, suppose there
was perfect competition ex ante in the market for component B
and none for component A. If B brought an action against either X or Y, a reasonable royalty using the incremental ex ante
155
approach would be $0.
D. IMPLICATIONS
In the Introduction, we conceded that our proposed theoretical framework—under which a FRAND royalty reflects an
SEP’s incremental contribution to the value of the standard—
probably cannot be directly implemented in practice (though
the same is true of other idealized approaches, including the incremental ex ante approach). Although one might imagine, as
we stated above, a three-step process in which an SSO negotiates an aggregate royalty with users in advance of the users
156
having incurred any sunk costs, in reality SSOs do not do this
(nor do we suggest that they should). Any testimony about how
such negotiations, had they actually occurred, would have transpired necessarily would involve a great deal of speculation. It
is likewise difficult for us to imagine much good resulting from
having experts “educate” juries in the intricacies of concepts
like Shapley pricing. Given the costs and uncertainties of patent litigation as things stand, one might ask, what good is a
theoretical model that either cannot be used at all, or only at
enormous expense in terms of money and predictability?
The answer to this question is twofold. First, having an
appropriate conceptual benchmark is useful in determining
which of the seven principles set out in the Introduction should

154. The FRAND royalty payable by X or Y to A would be $0.
155. The FRAND royalty payable by X to A would be $140 and by Y to A
would be $100.
156. Or, as described infra Appendix A, more accurately as a cooperative
game with transferable utility.
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be retained and which, if any, should be modified or discarded.
Relatedly, the benchmark also helps to determine how best to
interpret the principles that remain. Second, the benchmark
can be useful in determining what sorts of practical evidence
and methodological approaches should be admissible—namely,
those that are likely to be consistent with the conceptual
benchmark, as opposed to those that are not. We elaborate below.
1. Principles To Retain, Modify, or Discard
First, as discussed above (and in greater detail in Appendix
A), Shapley pricing is the natural interpretation of the incremental contribution of one technology when the value of the
standard is greater than the sum of its parts. Shapley pricing
in our model implements the incremental value principle, and
is therefore consistent with Judge Robart’s statement that a
“central” principle of (F)RAND royalties is that “the parties in a
hypothetical negotiation would set RAND royalty rates by looking at the importance of the SEPs to the standard and the importance of the standard and the SEPs to the products at is157
sue.” Our model therefore provides a central role for Principle
(4), the proportionality principle.
Shapley pricing also provides a natural interpretation of
Principle (3), the incremental ex ante principle, as meaning
that the royalty any patentee can receive is capped by the ex
ante incremental value of the patented technology as compared
158
with the best unpatented alternative. This contrasts with the
implementation of the incremental ex ante principle in Swanson & Baumol’s auction model. Our analysis in Parts II and III
above shows that if the incremental ex ante principle is understood as meaning the incremental value of the selected technology over the best alternative patented technology, it is inconsis-

157. Microsoft v. Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *3
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). Judge
Holderman has similarly stated that the royalty to a particular patentee must
reflect the value that patent contributes to the functionality. See Innovatio,
2013 WL 5593609, at *10 (“Imagine, for example, that the court has determined that a given patent portfolio provides 25% of the functionality of a
standard, and that the court is considering a proposed RAND rate based on
that determination. Logically, the other standard-essential patents outside of
the portfolio should comprise 75% of the value of the standard, or three times
the value of the asserted portfolio.”).
158. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed description of how this
emerges from our model.
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tent with both the incentive-to-invent and proportionality principles, because the patentee’s reward depends more upon the
state of ex ante competition than upon the value that implementers derive from the use of the invention. The result may be
a reward that either overcompensates or undercompensates the
inventor in relation to the invention’s contribution to the standard—and to the extent the result is likely to be undercompensation, the incremental ex ante approach also undermines
Principle (6), the incentive to participate in SSO activities.
Given the centrality of the incentive-to-invent and proportion159
ality principles to a system of patent incentives, this analysis
leads us to conclude that courts should discard the incremental
ex ante approach, at least in its “pure” Swanson & Baumol
form.
Our guiding principle is that the patentee is entitled to its
incremental contribution to the value of the standard, which excludes any part of the implementers’ sunk costs. Thus, under
our analysis, statements to the effect that royalties should reflect the value of the technology, not the value of the standard
(Principle (5)), should be interpreted to mean only that a patent
making a relatively small contribution to the value of a standard should not command a royalty that reflects the value of
the other, more important patents, nor should it reflect the implementers’ sunk costs. To permit the royalty to reflect the
value of the standard in this sense would violate the proportionality principle, among other things. At the same time, however, dynamic efficiency considerations counsel in favor of permitting the royalty to reflect a share of the value of
standardization, understood as the additional value arising
from widespread adoption of the technology on standardization,
which is proportionate to the technology’s contribution to that
value. There is no reason to treat value arising from widespread use due to standardization differently from value arising from widespread use due to a product that is successful for
other reasons.
Significantly, both the IEEE-SA Bylaws (which defines a
“Reasonable Rate” as “appropriate compensation to the patent
holder for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim excluding
the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential
159. Though, as noted above, cost considerations sometimes might trump
application of proportionality in favor of something simpler, such as numeric
proportionality. See supra text accompanying note 147. Nevertheless, we think
that proportionality should be the default principle.
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Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard” ) and the
Microsoft decision can be read in this fashion. As for the latter,
Judge Robart noted that, although there was “clear value to
implementers . . . to offer products compliant with the H.264
Standard, this value reflects the value of standard compliance
161
and interoperability, not the value of any individual patents.”
Consequently, testimony that related only to the general importance of the H.264 standard to Microsoft’s products “reflects
an improper attempt by Motorola to capture the value of the
H.264 Standard itself as opposed to a royalty on the actual eco162
nomic value of Motorola’s patented technology.” Similarly,
the no holdup principle (Principle (1)), should be understood as
standing for the proposition that the patentee cannot capture
any part of the user’s sunk costs or the value of other technologies, but it is unobjectionable for the patentee to appropriate
some part of the increased value derived from network effects
on standardization.
Once we decide that the patentee is entitled to its incremental contribution to the overall value of the standard, the incentive to invent and the incentive to participate (Principles (6)
and (7)) are automatically satisfied. Because the value distributed to the patentee is proportionate to the value to the user—
unlike the auction model—the incentive to invent is proportionate to the social value, as in the patent system generally.
To depart from Shapley pricing by increasing the reward to one
patentee, with a corresponding reduction to another patentee,
would provide an excessive incentive to invent to the first and
an inadequate incentive to invent to the second. If this reward
does not cover the costs of invention, this is simply because,
with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the invention was
160. IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS.
ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws
.pdf. In particular, we would argue that “the value of the patented feature,”
the “value of [the] patented technology,” and “appropriate compensation to the
patent holder” should be understood as including a portion of the increased
value due to network effects, but not any value beyond the patent’s marginal
contribution to the standard. This “value beyond” would include sunk costs,
differential opportunity costs, and the marginal contribution of other patents.
See supra note 42.
161. Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *42. Judge Robart further stated that
“negotiating parties would consider only the economic value of the patented
technology—based on the technology’s contribution to the standard and to the
implementer’s product itself—apart from the value associated with the standard.” Id.
162. Id. at *44.
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not worth the investment. If this reward does not provide an
adequate incentive to participate, in the sense that the patentee can get a higher value by remaining outside the standard, this simply means that the patented technology is more
163
valuable outside the standard than as part of it. Further, it is
the patentee who actually contributes to the standard who is
entitled to a reward, not a patentee who might have been included in the standard. This is necessary to provide the correct
incentive to invent, given that it is only a patentee whose patent is actually infringed can sue for infringement and collect a
royalty.
As for Principle (2), in our framework the anti-royalty
stacking principle is really just an outgrowth of proportionality:
no individual patent should command a disproportionate share
of its marginal contribution to the standard. The patentees as a
group are entitled to only a part of the value of the standard to
the user; because they cannot capture the user’s sunk costs,
they cannot obtain more than the value to the user. Consequently, the royalties cannot be excessive, in the sense that the
user will always pay less in royalties than the standard is actually worth to it. Translated into practical terms, if the patent
in suit contributes relatively little to the standard, but the royalty sought by the patent owner multiplied by the number of
other SEPs incorporated into the defendant’s product would exceed the revenue derived from that product, it is reasonable to
164
infer that the royalty is disproportionate.

163. Anne Layne-Farrar et al. consider an ex ante incremental value rule
under which the patentee would be entitled to the incremental increase in expected value contributed by its patent, where the expected value turns on the
increased probability of success if the patentee participates in the standard.
See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 11, at 27, 29. They show that this rule does
not ensure adequate participation because it does not fully distribute the profits of a successful standard, so under plausible conditions the patentee will
choose to stay out of the standard and negotiate participation ex post. Id. Our
model avoids the participation problem they address because the profits of the
successful standard are fully distributed to the participating patentees, so
there is no advantage to be gained by staying out initially.
164. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308,
2013 WL 5593609, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“[T]he court conclude[d] that
royalty stacking may be a concern when setting a RAND rate to ensure that
the asserted patents are not overvalued compared to the technological contribution they make to the standard.”); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *73 (noting concerns due to the patent contributing little to the applicable standard).
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2. Practical Implications
One direct practical implication of our approach is that it is
proper to award a running royalty either as damages for past
infringement or as an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction.
This may seem so unremarkable as to not be worth mentioning.
Reasonable royalties are routinely awarded on the basis of a
running royalty; no one has ever suggested that this is im165
proper, and we agree that it is not. But if we take seriously
the principle that the SEP owner should not capture any of the
value arising from network effects, the standard practice of
awarding running royalties would be entirely wrong. The increased social value of the standard due to network effects is
partly reflected in increased value of the technology to individual users, but the most direct effect is on sales; more people will
adopt the technology after standardization. That being so, any
running royalty in which the amount owing to the patentee increases with total sales will reflect in large part the increased
value of the technology due to standardization. If the SEP
owner were not entitled to capture any of the value arising on
standardization, understood as including network effects, then
the only proper reasonable royalty would be a lump sum based
not on actual sales, but on the sales that would have been anticipated had the technology never become part of the standard.
The fact that no one has ever proposed such an absurd rule
suggests to us that, whatever it might mean to say that the
SEP owner is not entitled to capture the value arising on standardization, it cannot mean that the patentee is not entitled to
any part of the value arising from network effects.
A second direct implication of our approach relates to the
timing of the hypothetical negotiation. Courts often refers to
the hypothetical negotiation occurring just prior to the first in166
fringement, but the literature sometimes refers to a date
167
prior to the incurring of sunk costs or prior to standardiza165. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing a running royalty license, without any suggestion
that it is improper).
166. See, e.g., id. at 1324 (“The hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach . . . attempts to ascertain the royalty upon
which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an
agreement just before infringement began.”).
167. See William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle
of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 426 (2016) (“The hypothetical
negotiation date should be set at just prior to the time that the infringer became committed to using the infringing technology, which in most cases will
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168

tion. While these dates sometimes coincide, this is by no
means necessary either in theory or in practice. Consistent
169
with a recent proposal by Lee and Melamed, under our approach the correct date is a date prior to the defendant’s having
incurred sunk costs. Since this date may occur prior to infringement, using the date of first infringement would facilitate
the patentee’s ability to extract sunk costs. At the same time,
the proposal that the hypothetical negotiation should take
place prior to standardization is premised on the view that the
patentee should not be able to capture any value arising from
network effects, which is also inconsistent with our approach.
Nevertheless, choosing the correct date is not quite as crucial
under our approach because whichever date is chosen, the negotiation is assumed to take place will full ex post knowledge
(so a date that is too early, at least, makes no difference). Further, we emphasize that the notion of an ex ante hypothetical
negotiation is only a mechanism to ensure that sunk costs
holdup is not permitted; so long as the particular evidence used
to assess the reasonable royalty does not itself reflect sunk
costs, the exact date of the negotiation is irrelevant.
Beyond this, our proposed approach can help courts to determine which evidence and methodologies should be admitted
in evidence (possibly with modifications), and which should not.
For example, courts often consider comparable licenses as a
guide to determining the royalty a willing licensor and licensee
170
would have agreed to, and our approach can be useful in analyzing which licenses should be considered comparable. In general, licenses that were negotiated against a backdrop of unpatented alternatives are more likely to be comparable under
our approach than would licenses negotiated ex post against a
threat of injunctive relief (which would enable the licensor to
171
extract a portion of sunk costs). In addition to these simple

be the lock-in date.”).
168. See Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 55, at 1491–92 (considering the
positive impact of having the hypothetical negotiation prior to standardization).
169. See Lee & Melamed, supra note 167.
170. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1305 (using rates paid for
comparable licenses as a guide in determining if the jury’s royalty payment
assessment in determining damages was reasonable).
171. Though whether licensors routinely do extract sunk costs is, ultimately, an empirical issue. See Wright, supra note 65, at 807 (“Although the rate
negotiated with the injunction threat is likely greater than the rate negotiated
without the threat of injunction, it does not follow that the former is above
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observations, however, we can also use our approach to evaluate the methodologies the courts have approved in the cases
thus far.
For example, in Microsoft two families of patents were at
issue, one relating to the Wi-Fi 802.11 standard, the other to
172
the H.264 video coding standard. In addressing the Wi-Fi
standard, the court applied the proportionality principle to exclude consideration of a majority of the asserted Wi-Fi patents
on the basis that even if they were essential to the standard, it
was not alleged that they were practiced by the Microsoft prod173
ucts at issue. Judge Robart also gave extensive consideration
to the importance of the asserted patents to the standard and
to Microsoft’s products in particular, concluding that the patents related to the H.264 standard generally provided only a
modest contribution to the standard, and those related to the
802.11 standard generally provided very little contribution to
174
the standard. As a consequence, the court held that Motorola
was not entitled to any increase in the FRAND rate that had
been derived from the best comparable license for the H.264
175
patents, and for the 802.11 patents the court held the standard rate derived from the comparable license represented a
ceiling which was likely higher than the appropriate FRAND
176
rate. These uses of proportionality are consistent with our
recommended approach.
On the other hand, with regard to the relevance of ex ante
alternatives our analysis is somewhat different from that of
Judge Robart, who considered whether there were ex ante alternatives to the patents at issue without distinguishing be177
tween patented and unpatented alternatives. Under our apF/RAND.”).
172. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.
2015).
173. See id. at *55 (discussing the 802.11 patents).
174. Id. at *84, *98. Judge Robart held that the remaining Wi-Fi patents
generally contributed very little to the standard. Id. at *57–58, *60, *63. The
patents related to the H.264 standard were somewhat more important to that
standard. See id. at *28–29, *32–33, *39 (analyzing the importance of the patents related to H.264 in relation to that standard). However, that importance
was substantially diminished because almost all of them (fourteen of sixteen)
related only to interlaced video, which was of minimal importance to Microsoft’s products. Id. at *39, *42, *47–49.
175. Id. at *86.
176. Id. at *92.
177. See id. at *53 (“If viable alternatives existed, the patents are less im-
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178

proach, only the latter would be relevant. Nevertheless, on
the facts the court held that that availability of alternatives
had not been established or that the selected technology was
179
superior, so the availability of ex ante alternatives (patented
or not) did not have any impact on the outcome. Similarly,
Judge Robart cited as the theoretical ideal the incremental ex
180
ante approach that our proposal rejects, but when he actually
came to apply the principle that a patentee is only entitled to
the value of its technology, he interpreted it in a manner consistent with our approach, as meaning that the patentee is not
181
entitled to a disproportionate share of the royalties.
Ultimately, the court in Microsoft based the FRAND rate
182
ranges on comparable rates charged by patent pools, despite
noting a number of shortcomings with pools generally as
comparables. We agree with the court’s assessment of at least
183
some of these shortcomings, but there is one criticism that we
view as misplaced: namely, its concern that:
[P]atent pools do not use an incremental value approach, an approach
that is required in the court’s hypothetical negotiation paradigm. In
other words, patent pools do not try to determine the incremental
value of every patent in the pool compared to alternatives that were
184
available prior to defining the standard.

As noted above, however, the court did not distinguish between
patented and unpatented alternatives, and under our approach
the failure to consider the incremental value over patented al-

portant to the standard and will be valued accordingly.”); see also id. at *38
(considering an alternative which was identified as patented).
178. See infra Appendix B.
179. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *28, *30, *36, *38, *41–42 (H.264
patents); id. at *54 (802.11 patents).
180. See id. at *14.
181. See id. at *42.
182. See id. at *82 (discussing the MPEG LA H.264 pool for the video coding patents); id. At *89 (discussing the Via Licensing 802.11 patent pool for
Motorola’s 802.11 SEP portfolio). The court rejected the various licenses suggested by Motorola as comparables for reasons unrelated to our approach,
such as the fact that they were negotiated under threat of a potential infringement action or were part of a larger license of both standard-essential
and other patents. Id. at *67, *69, *71–72.
183. For example, Judge Robart stated that “the patent-counting royalty
allocation structure of pools does not consider the importance of a particular
SEP to the standard or to the implementer’s products.” Id. at *80. His concern
that patent counting (numeric proportionality) might reduce the incentive to
participate for patentees with valuable patents, id., is fundamentally the same
as ours.
184. Id. at *80 (citation omitted).
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185

ternatives is not a defect at all, while the failure to consider
unpatented alternatives is important only if there is evidence
that there were unpatented alternatives that might have made
a similar contribution (which there was not in this case). More
generally, the use of patent pools can be consistent with our
theory. We have argued that the appropriate benchmark for a
FRAND royalty is that the total royalty paid by the user should
be the same as the royalty that a user would pay to a single patentee holding all the relevant patents. An ideal pool would do
exactly this, and the balance which a pool seeks between wide186
spread adoption and income for the patentees is the same
trade-off which would be faced by a single patentee seeking to
maximize its revenue without pricing itself out of the market.
Most of the problems with using pools as comparators relate to
the distribution of the royalties among the various licensors
187
with patents of differing value. This is certainly an important
problem from the patentee’s perspective, but from the user perspective, which is to say in terms of the total royalty payable to
license a standard, a successful patent pool is the best possible
comparator.
188
Similarly, the court’s analysis in Innovatio is broadly
consistent with our approach. In Innovatio, Judge Holderman
employed what was referred to in the case as a “Top Down” approach by, first, determining the applicable royalty base (here,
a Wi-Fi chip, which the court determined was the smallest sal189
able patent practicing unit); second, calculating the average
185. See infra Appendix B.
186. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *82 (“[The] two cornerstones of
the RAND obligation [are]: (1) . . . to create valuable standards, while at the
same time, (2) ensuring widespread adoption.”).
187. Id. at *80. The other main problem is that in some pools, important
licensors are also users, which means they are willing to accept less than their
proportionate share of the standard as licensors because of the compensating
benefit of a low rate to them in their role as licensees. Id. at *81. Judge Robart
acknowledged this problem and explicitly accounted for it in his FRAND rate
calculation. See id. at *81, *85.
188. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013
WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
189. See id. at *12–18. In a series of decisions, the Federal Circuit has held
that the “entire market value” of an end product may serve as a royalty base
only when “the patented feature drives the demand for an entire multicomponent product.” LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d
51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As a general rule, the correct base is the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit.” Id. (quoting Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283, 287–88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)); see also Virnetx, Inc.
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that, even
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sales price of a chip over what the court viewed as the relevant
190
time period ($14.85); third, multiplying that price by the average profit margin over that period (12.1 percent), thus lower191
ing the base to $1.80; fourth, multiplying the base by eightyfour percent, the value believed “attributable to the top 10% of
192
802.11 standard-essential patents, to obtain $1.51”; and fifth,
multiplying $1.51 by 19/300, based on an estimate that there
are approximately 3000 patents essential to the standard at issue (resulting in 300 falling within the “top 10%”) and that Innovatio’s 19 SEPs (which the court viewed as moderate to mod193
erate-high in importance) were among these 300 top patents.
Consistent with our proposal, this approach eliminated the risk
of royalty stacking and accorded proportionately more value to
194
the patents deemed important to the standard.
That said, we would suggest some modifications that would
conform the top-down approach more closely to our own. First,
and perhaps most importantly, Judge Holderman reconstructed
the average chip price from 1997 (the date of the hypothetical
negotiation) to 2013 (by which date all but three of the patents
195
had expired), to calculate a royalty base of $14.85. In doing
so, Judge Holderman rejected the expert’s proposal to use a
weighted average of $3.99—which reflected much lower chip
prices in the later years as the number of units sold increased
(from 5.4 million in 2000 to over 2 billion in 2015)—reasoning
that the increase in chip sales was “due to the increased demand for Wi-Fi products resulting from the interoperability of
the products due to standardization,” and that the court must

after identification of the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, further apportionment may be necessary).
190. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *41.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *43 (“[T]he top 10% of all electronics patents account for 84% of
the value in all electronics patents.” (citing Mark Schankerman, How Valuable
Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 94
tbl.5 & n.12 (1998))). Whether this estimate still holds poses an interesting
question. See Sidak, supra note 14, at 1019–20, for discussion in the context of
IEEE’s 802.11 wireless standard.
193. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38–39, *43. The court noted, however, that “many of those 3000 patents are likely less valuable to the standard
than Innovatio’s patents because their essentiality has not been judicially confirmed.” Id. at *43.
194. See id. (according more value to the patents deemed important).
195. Id. at *41. Because the relevant data went back only to 2000, Judge
Holderman assumed that the average price per chip during 1997–99 was the
same as the average price for 2000. Id.
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“not consider the effect of standardization when evaluating the
196
ex ante negotiation in 1997.” In our view, however, it would
have been appropriate to use the lower number. Under the contingent ex ante framework, the relevant question is what royalty the parties would have agreed to ex ante, with the benefit of
all relevant ex post information (here, the fact that the standard was successful and that chip prices declined more rapidly
in recent years). Using this ex post information in Innovatio ac197
tually might have resulted in a lower royalty rate. Second, for
somewhat more technical reasons, we question whether the
court was correct to reduce the base by the average profit mar198
gin on sales of Wi-Fi chips during the period in question.
196. Id. at *39–41.
197. We say “might,” because, as discussed infra note 198, we are not sure
that the court’s next step, of reducing the base by the average profit margin
per chip, was correct. In theory it is also debatable whether the base should
normally be the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, or whether it could be
the revenue from sales of the entire infringing device (as may be common outside the litigation setting). See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d
1201, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[Jury] instructions [must] fully explain the need
to apportion the ultimate royalty award to the incremental value of the patented feature from the overall product.”). Courts in the U.S. prefer use of the
smallest salable patent-practicing unit largely out of concern that juries will
otherwise award inappropriately large royalties, even though (as a matter of
theory) a large base multiplied by a smaller rate could be identical to a small
base multiplied by a larger rate. Id. at 1226–27. In the context of a top-down
approach, however, use of the smallest salable patent-practicing does have the
advantage of eliminating from consideration all of the SEPs that read on other
components of a multicomponent end product.
Somewhat in contrast to the court in Innovatio, the district court in Microsoft “did to an extent take into account” ex post information, specifically
“the present-day value to Microsoft of Motorola’s patents” in concluding that “a
third-party valuation of Motorola’s 802.11 SEPs was only somewhat probative
because, at the time of the valuation, ‘Motorola’s 802.11 SEP portfolio’ was
much larger than the portfolio ‘as it exists today.’” Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *97 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013)).
The appellate court found no error in this, stating that “it would have been
impracticable for the court to consider only such evidence as could pinpoint the
value of Motorola’s patents to Microsoft at a precise point in time” and noting,
among other things, “the need for flexibility in determining a royalty rate for a
RAND-encumbered patent.” Id. at 1042.
198. The rationale for using the average profit was to “isolate[ ] the portion
of the income from the sale of the chip available to the chipmaker to pay royalties on intellectual property,” but the logic is not obvious. Innovatio, 2013 WL
5593609, at *38. Realistically, one might expect that some portion of the
$13.05 cost of producing chips ($14.85 less the $1.80 profit margin calculated
by Judge Holderman) was itself due to payment of royalties for some of the
other 3000 or so patents (though presumably some of them may not have been
licensed ahead of time). Moreover, even if we ignore that point, the court’s
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Finally, there’s Ericsson, one of the few appellate decisions
to date to address the subject of FRAND royalties. Correctly in
our view, the Ericsson court stressed the need for the royalty to
be proportionate in the sense that an SEP making only a small
contribution to the standard should receive a commensurately
small royalty, not one that reflects the value of the standard as
199
a whole. Nevertheless, as noted in the Introduction, the Ericsson court also emphasized that the “royalty must be premised on the value of the patented feature, not any value added
200
by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology.” We
have shown that the distinction between the value of the technology and the value added by standardization is by no means
201
clear, and that the latter term has been used to refer to sunk
costs holdup, network value appropriation, and the problem of
apportionment. As we have noted, these concepts are routinely
conflated, and Ericsson is no exception, so it is not clear how
that instruction is to be understood—though the court did seem
to view its concern about capturing the value added by stand-

analysis seems to contemplate all of the chip maker’s profits potentially being
eaten up by IP rights (if all 3000 SEP owners demanded royalties), which
seems unlikely. In theory, a better method would have been to determine what
portion of the cost of producing chips is typically attributable to IP and what
portion is attributable to other factors, and then to divide up the “IP portion”
in accordance with the importance of the patents in suit. One recent study, for
example, claims that about twenty-five percent of the cost of producing an entire smartphone goes to patent royalties. Ann Armstrong et al., The
Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components
Within Modern Smartphones 2 (May 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443848. We make no claims concerning the accuracy
of this number. Such information may not be available, however, in which case
perhaps there is no obvious way to avoid some arbitrary limitation.
199. See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232–33 (“Just as we apportion damages for
a patent that covers a small part of a device, we must also apportion damages
for SEPs that cover only a small part of a standard. In other words, a royalty
award for a SEP must be apportioned to the value of the patented invention
(or at least to the approximate value thereof ), not the value of the standard as
a whole.”).
200. Id. at 1232; see also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v.
CISCO Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (vacating a damages
award, on the ground that “the district court erred in failing to account for
value accruing to the ‘069 patent from the standard’s adoption”); Ericsson, 773
F.3d, at 1233 (concluding that “Supreme Court precedent also requires apportionment of the value of the patented technology from the value of its standardization,” and that the jury “must be told to consider the difference between
the added value of the technological invention and the added value of that invention’s standardization”).
201. See supra text accompanying note 125.
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ardization as distinct from the problem of apportionment, and
203
it addressed sunk costs holdup separately. To the extent the
Ericsson court did mean that the patentee is not entitled to appropriate any of the value of the standard, this holding is inconsistent with our theory. We therefore urge the Federal Circuit to distance itself from this interpretation in the future.
Moreover, given the court’s suggestion that “[t]rial courts
should . . . consider the patentee’s actual RAND commitment in
204
crafting the jury instruction,” we submit that courts can and
should interpret the IEEE-SA Bylaw “excluding the value, if
any, resulting from the inclusion of [an SEP] in the IEEE
205
Standard” in a manner that is consistent with our approach.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have proposed various principles
for calculating FRAND royalties, among them that the royalty
should not reflect “the value of the standard.” As we have
shown, however, this principle could be understood to mean
202. See Ericsson, 774 F.3d at 1235 (“[D]istrict courts must make clear to
the jury that any royalty award must be based on the incremental value of the
invention, not the value of the standard as a whole or any increased value the
patented feature gains from its inclusion in the standard.”); see also id. at
1231 (stating that some of the Georgia-Pacific factors “need to be adjusted for
RAND-encumbered patents,” because the use of such patents is inflated due to
their essentiality).
203. Id. at 1233–34.
204. Id. at 1231.
205. IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS.
ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws
.pdf. In another document, however, the IEEE-SA states that:
As a hypothetical example, during the development of a standard, a
Working Group considers alternatives and makes a decision based on
many factors. Suppose two and only two alternative technologies are
available, both patented and both offering the same performance, implementation cost, and all other qualities. Therefore, the value of the
two options is exactly the same, although only one will be selected.
Any additional value imputed to the selected option because of its inclusion in the standard is excluded.
UNDERSTANDING PATENT ISSUES DURING IEEE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
13–14 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N 2016), https://
standards.ieee.org/faqs/patents.pdf. The U.S. Department of Justice nevertheless interprets IEEE-SA’s definition of “Reasonable Rate” as excluding “value
arising from the cost or inability of implementers to switch from technologies
included in a standard,” which is what we mean by sunk costs holdup. Letter
from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Michael A. Lindsay, Esquire, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/04/311470
.docx.
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any or all of three distinct concepts: that the royalty should not
reflect the implementer’s sunk costs; that the patentee should
not extract any of the value resulting from network effects; or
that the royalty should be proportionate to the patent’s contribution to the standard. Failure to distinguish among them, or
to classify all three as manifestations of holdup, results in
questionable policy prescriptions, because only the sunk costs
and proportionality problems are associated with static or dynamic inefficiency.
This Article has proposed the combination of a contingent
ex ante framework for calculating reasonable royalties with ex
post Shapley pricing, resulting in the foundational principle
that a FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental contribution of the patent to the value of the standard to the user. As
we have shown, our proposal would prevent patentees from extracting sunk costs or a disproportionate share of standard
value, but (contrary to some other proposed approaches) it
would enable them to draw some of the increased value resulting from network effects. Moreover, our framework interprets
the various principles articulated to date in a manner that is
largely consistent with the decided cases and that will enable
courts to apply those principles coherently and consistently
with sound innovation policy. Finally, while abstract, the proposal can be used as a benchmark for determining which types
of practical evidence and methodologies courts should admit as
proxies for the ideal approach.

Appendices to The Value of the Standard
Our discussion in the main body of the article describes the
determination of a reasonable royalty as involving a hypothetical three-stage process. That description isolates some of the
key features of our approach. These Appendices provide a more
detailed technical explanation of our approach, though we do
not provide a fully formal model. Appendix A provides a basic
theoretical justification for the use of the Shapley value. Appendix B addresses two technical questions, namely whether
the hypothetical negotiation is carried out by individual users
or by users as a group, and how to deal with ex ante competition to be included in the standard.
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I. APPENDIX A
In the main text we propose that FRAND royalties be determined by the incremental contribution of the patent to the
value of the standard to the user, where the incremental value
is determined by ex post Shapley pricing. This Appendix justi206
fies the use of Shapley pricing. We argue that the setting of a
FRAND royalty should be conceptualized as the outcome of a
cooperative game with transferable utility. Adopting the
Shapley value as the solution concept flows naturally from this
basic modeling choice.
In game theory, cooperative games are those in which
207
players are able to enter into binding commitments. In noncooperative games, in contrast, players act independently; they
may anticipate how others will respond and adjust their behavior accordingly, but they do not have the ability to bind each
208
other to any particular course of action. For example, the famous Prisoners’ Dilemma is a non-cooperative game in which
the dilemma arises because neither player can bind the other to
209
the choice that is in their mutual best interest. If the same
problem were modeled as a cooperative game, the players
would be able to enter into a binding agreement not to defect.
A basic question is whether the FRAND process should be
modeled as a cooperative or non-cooperative game. In our view,
the choice is clear. The patent system itself can only be modeled
as a cooperative game. The central justification for the patent
system is that without the ability to make binding commitments between agents—namely innovators and users—
innovation incentives reduce to a prisoners’ dilemma: if the inventor “cooperates” by inventing, it is in the user’s interest to
“defect” by buying a cheaper copy from a free-rider who did not
incur the sunk costs of invention. Anticipating this, the inventor will “defect” by not investing in invention. If the user cooperates by paying up front, it is in the inventor’s interest to defect by not investing sunk costs in invention. The patent system
solves this dilemma by (in effect) allowing the user to make a
binding commitment to pay if it chooses to use the invention.
The property right granted by the state to the inventor repre-

206. The use of ex post information is addressed in the main text and in
our companion article, Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15.
207. See OSBORNE & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 113, at 2.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 16.
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sents the binding commitment by users as a group to “cooperate” by paying for the invention if the patentee “cooperates” by
inventing. This binding commitment by users is fundamental to
the patent system, and it directly implies that the patent system must be modeled as a cooperative game.
In contrast, the Swanson and Baumol model ignores this
central feature of the patent system. As they acknowledge,
their model is a purely static one, in which “all investments in
210
R&D by the patent holders already have been sunk.” It is because of this assumption that each patentee is bid down to its
incremental marginal value as compared with other patentees.
But this assumption begs the central question of the patent
system: why would anyone ever develop an invention knowing
that they would not receive any reward? In effect, the auction
model applies non-cooperative game theory to an incompletely
specified game. If we were to try to model the patent system as
a non-cooperative game, we would have to complete the backward induction process and ask whether the patentee would
have had an incentive to invent the invention in the first place.
As discussed in the main text, the answer is that they would
not: the entire incentive system would degenerate into the defect/defect solution of the non-cooperative Prisoners’ Dilemma,
which is why the patent system cannot be modeled as a non211
cooperative game. On the other hand, if we treat the patent
system as a cooperative game, we cannot accept Swanson and
Baumol’s premise that the inventor’s costs are already sunk
when the royalties are decided.
It is sometimes said that cooperative game solutions formalize notions of fairness and distributive justice, while non212
cooperative games are concerned with efficiency. That is misleading. While cooperative game theory does reflect a fairness
concept, efficiency as a normative principle also relies ultimately on a particular notion of fairness, namely on the principle that a just reward to an input factor is its marginal produc213
tivity, as reflected in a competitive market paradigm. And the

210. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 18.
211. See supra Part II.C.
212. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 685, 693 (describing
the Swanson & Baumol model as being “rooted in the concept of economic efficiency,” while cooperative game theory relates to “concepts of fairness”).
213. See, e.g., Young, supra note 113 (“In a perfectly competitive market,
the wage of a laborer equals his marginal product. No ethical judgment need
be made as to whether marginal productivity is a ‘just’ rule of compensation so
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fairness principle underpinning the Shapley value as a solution
concept for cooperative games is fundamentally the same,
namely “the idea that rewards should be in proportion to con214
tributions.” The difference is that cooperative game theory allows us to define what is meant by “marginal contribution”
when outputs are superadditive. As H. Peyton Young has explained:
In theory, marginal cost pricing is the only pricing mechanism that is
consistent with economic efficiency in the large. Unfortunately it is
typically unworkable as a cost allocation method because marginal
costs need not sum to total costs, as required for an allocation. Indeed,
marginal cost pricing may not even cover costs. This possibility arises
in natural monopolies characterized by increasing returns to scale
and declining marginal costs, such as distribution networks for trans215
port, electric power, water, and communications services.

The problem that marginal cost pricing may not cover costs because of increasing returns to scale is exactly the problem
which justifies the patent system. It is the failure to cover
costs, consequent on adoption of marginal cost pricing, which
makes incremental ex ante pricing inadequate as an approach
to FRAND royalties.
The early work on applications of Shapley value was explicitly concerned with efficient production in a decentralized
216
firm with joint costs. The magic of ideal markets generally is
that individuals will make decisions that are socially optimal,
217
based only on price information. However, the classical market described by non-cooperative game theory fails when decisions by one player impose costs or benefits on another. Superadditive games are those in which the two players together
produce more than the sum of what they can produce individu218
for example, any standard involving complementary
ally;
patents is superadditive. Superadditive games cannot be optimally solved in a non-cooperative market because the synergy
from the combination is an externality to each individual

long as competitive markets are accepted as the correct form of economic organization.” (emphasis added)).
214. Id.
215. H.P. Young, Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation, 53 ECONOMETRICA
757, 757 (1985).
216. See, e.g., Martin Shubik, Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs, and Internal Pricing, 8 MGT. SCI. 325, 326–28 (1962).
217. Of course real markets are never ideal, but nonetheless, that is the
attraction.
218. See OSBORNE & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 113, at 258.
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219

agent. The market response is the firm, but the firm simply
220
shifts the focus of the problem. If the manager of the firm has
full information about costs and benefits, she can simply order
individual agents to act for the greater good of the firm as a
whole, rather than in their narrow self-interest. But in any
large firm higher-level managers will not have full information
about each division. Information is often compressed through
profit and loss statements based on decision centers within the
firm, and the division is given direction through incentives provided by bonuses or increased resource allocation based on
those statements. Thus there is a managerial problem of decentralized decision making: how to allocate resources among divisions so as to maximize the overall firm profit, while knowing
only how each division’s output contributes to the profit of the
whole (but not the specifics about how each division is run). As
Shubik notes, “An optimally decentralized system will have the
property that the net effect of all individual actions will be
more favorable to the firm than the actions selected by any
221
other array of decision centers.” If, on the other hand, the
wrong cost allocation method is chosen, “it is possible that individual rational action based upon the cost assignment may add
222
up to corporate idiocy.” Thus, it is necessary to design a reward structure “so that the selection of choices which are best
for the individual decision-maker will always coincide with
223
those which are best for the organization,” and “[a] goal of
good management should be to design a reward system for
those who take risks in making decisions in such a manner that
the rewards to the individual correlate positively with the
224
worth of the decision to the organization.” This is not a matter of fairness, but rather of corporate efficiency. A firm that
rewards its subordinate decision-makers for contributing to the
worth of the firm as a whole will eventually prevail over a firm
that does otherwise.
219. See id.
220. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937), reprinted in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33
(1988).
221. See Shubik, supra note 216, at 329.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 328.
224. Id. at 325; see also Young, supra note 215 (“A reasonable goal of good
management is to adopt a system of incentives that rewards individuals for
making decisions that increase the firm’s overall profits and penalizes decisions that damage profits.”).
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The patent system addresses what is fundamentally the
same system of decentralized decision making with limited information. As is often noted, if the government knew what inventions would be best for society as a whole, it could simply
225
fund them directly. This corresponds to the situation where a
manager has sufficient information to simply direct the employees to act optimally. This does occur sometimes, both for
firms and governments, but it is not a general solution to the
problem. The problem of FRAND royalties for complementary
patented technologies is exactly analogous to the managerial
problem of how to allocate resources so as to encourage decentralized decision makers to act for the benefit of the whole.
226
It is this problem which is solved by Shapley pricing. As
discussed in more detail below, Shapley value provides the only
solution to this problem that is consistent with a few simple
axioms. As such, it is “the natural interpretation[] of marginal227
ism in problems of pure cooperation” with transferable utility. Thus the difference between market efficiency and Shapley
pricing is technical, not philosophical.
Consider a simple example which illustrates the problem
that is addressed by Shapley pricing. Suppose A has a patented
battery-saving technology covered by one patent and B has patented a cellular communication technology also covered by one
patent, and these products are embodied in a smartphone.
There is a user, X, who uses her phone while working out of the
office visiting clients. The battery-saving technology is worth $1
on its own, because without the cellular communication capability the phone can only be used for playing games, while a
phone with only the cellular technology is worth $10; but the
two together are worth $15 because they allow the phone to be
used for a full business day without recharging. Technology A
adds $1 in combination with unpatented technologies, and $5
in combination with B. A full description of A’s marginal contribution to the value of the phone in the hands of X is ($1, $5),
to reflect both of these possibilities. Now suppose there is another user, Y, who works in an office and who likes to play bat-

225. See supra note 100 for articles discussing the benefits of patents over
prizes.
226. See Young, supra note 215 (motivating the discussion of AumannShapley pricing, a generalization of Shapley pricing to continuous production
functions, by focusing on “the incentives that different cost accounting methods create for the adoption of more efficient techniques of production”).
227. Young, supra note 113, at 268.
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tery-draining video games on his phone while commuting. For
Y, the battery-saving technology is relatively more important,
and the cellular communication is less important. Suppose that
for Y the battery-saving technology is worth $2 on its own, the
cellular technology is worth $7, and the two together are worth
$13. The marginal contribution of technology A to user Y ($2,
$6) is higher in all respects—both in combination with unpatented technology, and in combination with technology B—than
for user X. On the other hand, the total value of the bundle to Y
is less than for user X. The marginality principle says that the
payoff to A from user Y should be higher than the payoff from
user X, even though the technology as a bundle is worth less to
228
Y than to X. The intuition is that the marginal contribution
made by the battery-saving technology to user Y is higher any
way you look at it—whether relative to a system with or without cellular technology—so the incremental value of that technology to user Y must be higher than its incremental value to
user B. This of course implies that the royalty that Y pays to B
must be less than the royalty that X pays to B (though it does
not imply that the royalty Y pays to B will be less than the royalty Y pays to A).
As a matter both of law and fairness we need to assess royalties that reflect the importance of each technology to the users, and ideally which reflect the technologies’ marginal values.
But it is not clear how to define the marginal value. Should we
say that A should receive $5 from user X and $6 from user Y,
because that is how much value A adds relative to B alone?
That would imply that B would get $10 and $7, respectively. Or
should we say that B should get $14 from X and $11 from Y,
because that is how much B adds to A alone? That would imply
that A gets $1 and $2, respectively, which is much less than if
we look at it from A’s perspective.
The Shapley value sharing rule (described in the main
229
text) is a solution to this problem that satisfies three intuitively appealing axioms: (1) symmetry; (2) full distribution; and
230
(3) marginality. The symmetry principle requires that players

228. See H.P. Young, Monotonic Solutions of Cooperative Games, 14 INT’L J.
GAME THEORY 65, 81 (1985) (providing a definition of the marginality principle).
229. See supra Part II.E.
230. See Shapley, supra note 112, at 308–09. The Shapley value can be derived from a number of related sets of axioms. This particular axiomization is
due to H.P. Young. Young, supra note 228; see also Young, supra note 215. We
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who make the same contribution to the value of the standard
231
(the payoff) must be treated in the same way. A general problem with cooperative games is that coalitions may form solely
in order to extract value from another player. For example, if
the game has three players A, B, and C, all of whom can produce nothing individually, $10 in collaboration with one other
player and $60 in collaboration with both other players, the intuitively fair solution would be that all three cooperate and
each receives a payoff of $20. However, A and B might agree to
present C with a take-it-or-leave-it offer in which A and B
would cooperate with C only if C agreed to accept $12, while A
and B each received $24. The symmetry axiom prohibits this
kind of bargain. The full distribution axiom requires that the
payoff is fully distributed: that is, the parties do not leave
232
money on the table. The third axiom, marginality, captures
the notion that a player’s payoff should depend only on its own
233
marginal contribution to the overall output. In a cooperative
game, the player’s marginal contribution is not a single number; it is described by the function or vector that describes the
player’s marginal contribution to all possible coalitions. The
marginality principle says that if A’s marginal contribution increases in some respect, but does not decrease in any respect,
then A’s royalty must increase.
It turns out that the Shapley value is the only sharing rule
234
which satisfies all of these principles. In our example, using
Shapley pricing A would get $3 from user X and $4 from user Y,
235
while B would get $12 and $9, respectively. This seems intui-

use it because it relates naturally to the relevant legal principles. The full distribution axiom is often called “efficiency.” The term “efficiency” is confusing,
both because it does not mean the same thing as in the general economics literature and because it is not used consistently even in the cooperative game
theory literature. We will therefore avoid it. Shapley’s original principles were
symmetry, the carrier axiom and additivity. Alvin E. Roth, Introduction to the
Shapley Value, in THE SHAPLEY VALUE, supra note 113, at 1, 5. The carrier
axiom (referred to by Shapley as “efficiency,” but more commonly known as
the carrier axiom) has two components, namely full distribution and the null
player axiom. Id. For that reason the Shapley value is often characterized as
being based on four axioms. See, e.g., MICHAEL MASCHLER ET AL., GAME THEORY 749–51 (2013). Young’s marginality axiom can be derived from additivity
and the null player axiom. See Young, supra note 228, at 71.
231. See Shapley, supra note 112, at 309–10.
232. See Roth, supra note 230, (referring to full distribution as “efficient”).
233. Young, supra note 113, at 268.
234. Roth, supra note 230.
235. This is a simplification. We endorse a bargaining model in which the
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tively sound; B gets more from both X and Y than does A, be236
cause B’s technology is more important to both X and Y, but A
gets relatively more from Y than from X because A’s technology
is relatively more important to Y. This, we suggest, reflects the
legal principles that “the patentee’s royalty must be premised
237
on the value of the patented feature,” and “a patent that is
extremely important and central to the standard would reasonably command a higher royalty rate than a less important
238
patent.”
In summary, the patent system and the FRAND rate setting process in particular should be understood as a cooperative
game with transferable utility. The FRAND commitment by the
patentee to the user is a commitment not to charge excessive
royalties, but at the same time the patent system is a commitment by users to pay adequate royalties. We are seeking a solution which provides the patentee with the optimal incentive to
invent; as with a traditional efficiency analysis, the incentive is
both socially optimal and fair if it reflects the patentee’s marginal contribution. This is reflected in the notion that underpins Shapley pricing, namely that “rewards should be in proportion to contributions,” as well as in the legal principle that
“the parties in a hypothetical negotiation would set RAND royalty rates by looking at the importance of the SEPs to the standard and the importance of the standard and the SEPs to the
239
products at issue.” We therefore suggest that the FRAND
patentee is not necessarily entitled to the full social surplus attributable to its
invention. Consequently, it is more precise to say that A would bargain with X
over how to split the $3 marginal benefit attributable to X’s invention, and so
on.
236. The marginal benefit of B’s technology to X is ($10, $14) and to Y is
($7, $11).
237. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
238. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *20 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.
2015).
239. Id. at *3; see also In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No.
11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Imagine, for example, that the court has determined that a given patent portfolio provides
25% of the functionality of a standard, and that the court is considering a proposed RAND rate based on that determination. Logically, the other standardessential patents outside of the portfolio should comprise 75% of the value of
the standard, or three times the value of the asserted portfolio.”). The marginality principle excludes a sharing rule based on the number of patents held by
a patentee. Numerical sharing would imply that A gets $7.50 from X but only
$6.50 from Y, even though A’s technology is relatively more valuable to Y. Un-
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royalty setting problem is properly conceptualized as a cooperative game, and Shapley pricing is the appropriate solution.
II. APPENDIX B
This Appendix addresses two technical questions, namely
whether the hypothetical negotiation is carried out by individual users or by users as a group, and how to deal with ex ante
competition to be included in the standard.
A. INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP NEGOTIATIONS?
In describing our approach in the main text we referred to
the SSO negotiating with “users,” with intentional ambiguity
as to whether the negotiation would be with one user at a time,
240
or with users as a group. In our view, the correct approach in
principle is that the negotiation is with one user at a time; each
individual user bargains with each patentee to split the
Shapley value of that patentee’s contribution to the value of the
241
standard in the hands of that particular user. This is consistent with the case law, which indicates that the royalty should
reflect the value of the patent to the standard as well as the
value to the particular user. But the value of the patent to the
standard has no independent content; it is nothing but the aggregate of the value of the patent to all the individual users.
Consequently, considering the value of the standard to each
der numerical sharing, A’s royalty does not depend on its own merits alone; A
suffers because B’s technology is less valuable. Consistent with the marginality principle, the case law on proportionality rejects numerical sharing, at
least in principle. See id. at *10 (“In making this determination, the court
notes that it is not appropriate to determine the value of the non-asserted
standard-essential patents based merely on numbers. If a patent holder owns
ten out of a hundred patents essential to a given standard, it does not automatically mean that it contributes 10% of the value of the standard.”); id. (emphasizing that a “commonly understood principle of proportionality [is] that
[c]ompensation under [RAND] must reflect the patent owner’s proportion of all
essential patents,” and that “[t]his is not simply a numeric equation but the
compensation must, within reasonable bounds, reflect the contribution” (citing
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12)).
240. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
241. Gregory Sidak argues that it is wrong to treat the hypothetical negotiation as being between one SEP holder and a solitary representative of all implementers because this gives monopsony power to the implementers. See
Sidak, supra note 14, at 985. Our argument towards the same conclusion does
not turn on monopsony power, however. While we agree that it would be
wrong to credit the implementers with monopsony power, because the negotiation is hypothetical we could posit a negotiation with a single representative
user, simply by not crediting that user with monopsony power.
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user individually ensures that the reward to the patentee is
commensurate with both the value to the user and the value to
the standard.
With that said, looking to the value of the patent to the
standard might well have practical merit in a particular case if,
for example, there is good evidence that the technology in question was of little importance to the standard, and that the defendant is a more or less average user. That is, looking to the
value of the patent to the standard may, given the evidence, be
a good proxy for looking to the value of the standard to the par242
ticular user. On the other hand, given the individualized nature of patent litigation, there will often be direct evidence
about the value of the patented technology to the particular
user, in which case consideration of the value of patent to the
technology can simply be ignored. To give independent content
to the value of the patent to the standard would imply that if a
patent was valuable to the standard (which presumably means
it is valuable to most users), but worthless to a particular user,
that particular user might be liable to pay a substantial royalty
(though presumably somewhat less than the average user). We
see no particular merit in such a rule.
Our approach does imply that users for whom the standard
is equally valuable will pay the same royalty, but users who
value the standard differently may pay different amounts.
There is some debate in the literature as to whether the “nondiscriminatory” part of FRAND means that all users must pay
the same amount, or only that similarly situated users must
243
pay the same amount. We adopt the latter view. This is consistent with the user apportionment principle set out in the
case law, which specifies that the royalty must reflect the usefulness of the patent to the particular user, as well as to the
244
standard. It is also efficient, because it amounts to allowing
perfect price discrimination between users. However, if the
view ultimately prevails that “nondiscriminatory” means that
one royalty is charged to all users, this can be modeled in our
approach by a game in which the users are represented by a

242. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *8 (considering only the value to
the standard on the basis that this also reflects the value to the user).
243. See Carlton & Shampine, supra note 42, at 545–46 (reviewing the debate among economists regarding application of the nondiscriminatory principle).
244. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relevant legal rules.
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single user, who values the standard in a way that reflects
245
some kind of general preferences of the users.
B. THE IMPACT OF EX ANTE COMPETITION
A second technical issue is how our model deals with ex
ante competition to be included in the standard. The incremental ex ante principle that we have critiqued in the main
246
text can be understood as a particular form of a broader principle that competition will constrain the amount a patentee can
charge ex ante, but once the standard is adopted, that constraint is eliminated. Swanson and Baumol’s auction model is
in turn a particular instantiation of the incremental ex ante
principle, which we have argued is unsound, in part because it
247
effectively treats patented alternatives as unpatented. On the
other hand, we agree that a reasonable royalty should be
capped by the incremental value of the patented technology as
compared with the best unpatented technology that could have
been incorporated into the standard. That view effectively ignores patented alternatives entirely. This raises two questions.
First, how does the use of unpatented alternatives as a cap on
the value of the patented technology emerge from our framework? It might be said that if the negotiation takes place contingent on the ex post information as to what technology has
been selected to be part of the patent, then the user cannot
credibly threaten to switch to an unpatented technology, any
more than it can threaten to switch to an alternative patented
technology, because either case would require the user to give
up the benefits of standardization. Second, there is evidently a
middle ground between treating patented alternatives as if
they were unpatented, and ignoring them entirely. We have argued that a negotiation model is preferable to Swanson and
248
Baumol’s auction model; and we acknowledged that in general, outside the standards context, the presence of patented alternatives is likely to affect the royalty received by the chosen
patentee, even if it does not result in the royalty being driven
249
down to zero. How does this fit with our ex post framework?
245. How exactly the users’ preferences should be aggregated is a difficult
question which we will not deal with, as we are not sympathetic to this interpretation of the “nondiscriminatory” requirement.
246. See supra Part III.A.
247. See supra Part II.
248. See supra Part II.D.
249. In Innovatio, Judge Holderman rejected the auction model, on the ba-
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We must always keep in mind that our contingent ex ante
framework is simply a mechanism for determining a reasonable
royalty. We have pointed out that the traditional ex ante
framework should not be taken literally; simply because the
negotiation is assumed to take place ex ante, it should not be
automatically assumed that the parties only have ex ante in250
formation. The ex ante nature of the negotiation is a construct used to ensure that the patentee cannot extract sunk
costs, which would otherwise distort user and patentee incentives. Our contingent ex ante framework is similarly a mechanism which is used to ensure the appropriate incentive.
On the first point, the use of unpatented alternatives is
necessary to ensure that the patentee does not capture more
than the value of the previously existing technology. This is the
general argument for capping a reasonable royalty at the value
of the best noninfringing alternative. Consequently, the argument that in a truly ex post approach the user would not be
able to switch to an unpatented alternative is beside the point.
An ex post informational framework is not desirable in itself; it
is desirable because it implements sound policy objectives. If
the availability of an unpatented alternative does not emerge
naturally from considering a contingent ex post hypothetical
negotiation, then we will build it in. And it is very easy to build
in; when the Shapley value is assessed, we need only assume
that all unpatented technologies are “in the room” from the
outset. So, if the standard consists of a single patented technology which is no better than an unpatented alternative, the
Shapley value for that technology would be zero, because it
does not provide any incremental benefit over the best technology that could have been implemented using all the technologies “in the room” prior to the entry of the patented technology.
Similarly, suppose that patented technology A is necessary to
implement the standard (e.g., WLAN transmission capability),
and another technology adds value (e.g., battery saving functionality). If a patented technology B is used to implement the
battery saving functionality, but there is an unpatented tech-

sis that it is not plausible that competition between patentees would result in
them bargaining down to zero, but he nonetheless apparently accepts in principle that ex ante competition would drive down the royalty to some degree
(though that was not a factor on the facts). In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC
Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
250. See supra note 120 and accompanying text for a discussion of
knowledge in our model.
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nology that would serve equally well, the incremental value
added by technology B is always zero, regardless of the order in
which it is added to the mix of technologies, and so its Shapley
value is zero.
The second problem (regarding the existence of patented
alternatives) is more subtle. One question is how, technically,
the effect of ex ante competition could be incorporated into our
model. The second, more difficult question, is whether it is desirable to allow the ex ante competition to affect the reasonable
royalty.
The answer to the technical question is reasonably
straightforward: the presence of ex ante competition should be
reflected in increased bargaining power for the user in the contingent ex ante negotiation. To begin, consider an example from
outside the SEP context. Suppose that Cialis and Viagra are
perfect substitutes for treating erectile dysfunction. Under
Swanson and Baumol’s auction model, the price of either would
be zero, because one could be played off against the other. We
have argued that this is unsound in terms of dynamic effi251
ciency, and implausible in practice. However, it is entirely
plausible that the price that Pfizer can charge for Viagra in the
presence of competition from Cialis is less than it would be if
Viagra were the only product in its class. In a negotiation
model, the effect of competition between Cialis and Viagra is to
increase the user’s bargaining power. Using arbitrary numbers
to illustrate, if only Viagra is available, and it is worth $100 to
the user, and the user and Pfizer have equal bargaining power,
the user will pay $50. If Cialis is then developed, it is not plausible that the price for Viagra would drop to zero, as the auction
model or Bertrand competition implies, but it is plausible that
it would drop as compared with the monopoly price, say to
252
$40.
To extend this to the SEP context, suppose there are two
equivalent patented technologies, A and B, which are competing to be part of the standard. Even if A is selected, it seems
plausible that the price that could be demanded by A would be
depressed by ex ante competition from B, in the same way that
the price that can be demanded by Viagra is depressed by ex
post competition from Cialis. In our contingent ex ante model,

251. See supra Part II.C.
252. This does not imply any particular model of duopoly competition, such
as Cournot competition.
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the users are assumed to bargain with the successful patentee,
A, with knowledge that A has been selected, so that users can253
not use the threat of switching to B to drive down the price.
In this model the presence of ex ante competition by B can be
reflected by increasing the user’s bargaining power relative to a
case in which there was no ex ante competition. If there is only
one WLAN technology, A, worth $100 to the user, and the user
and A have equal bargaining power, the user will pay $50. If we
now suppose that ex ante there was another equivalent technology, B, that could have been included into the standard that
would have depressed the price that could be demanded by A,
this can be reflected by increasing the user’s bargaining power
in the ex post negotiation, even though the parties are assumed
to know that A has been chosen, so that the user cannot
threaten to switch to B. It may be said that this smuggles ex
ante competition into our ex post model. If so, we are unconcerned. Again, our model is a conceptual mechanism for determining a reasonable royalty. We are not concerned if the construction of the hypothetical negotiation has some constraints
that appear ad hoc in terms of how a contingent ex ante negotiation might be said to proceed, so long as they are those constraints are sound as a matter of policy. After all, it has always
been recognized that the standard hypothetical negotiation is
artificial, since in many cases the parties in question would
254
never actually have negotiated ex ante.
With that said, we would point out that the use of a contingent ex ante negotiation really addresses two functional points.
First, that the negotiation takes place ex ante is used to ensure
that the patentee cannot extract sunk costs. Second, that the
parties are assumed to have ex post information—they know
which technology has been selected—is used to ensure that incentive to invent is appropriate, by ensuring that the patentee
whose patents are actually infringed is in a position to demand
a royalty. The same goals could be achieved by making the converse assumptions: the hypothetical negotiation takes place ex
post, but in the absence of user sunk costs. In that case, patentee A, whose patent was actually infringed, would be entitled
to the full royalty, but the assumption that the user has no
253. See supra Part III.A.
254. See, e.g., John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 799–803 (2013) (describing the value of ex ante and
ex post knowledge in hypothetical negotiations).
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sunk costs means that the user could credibly threaten to
switch to another standard, including another patented standard, if A demanded too much. In this model, the ex post competition from alternative standards would limit the patentee’s
bargaining power in exactly the same way that the availability
of Cialis limits Pfizer’s bargaining power. The impact of competition on the user’s bargaining power may seem to emerge more
naturally from this model, but it is equivalent to the contingent
ex ante model.
The more difficult question is whether ex ante competition
should be taken into account at all. While it is intuitive to say
that the extent of ex ante competition should constrain the royalty, even if it does not drive the price to zero, the efficiency argument for this position is not clear. As discussed above, all
that is required from a static efficiency perspective is that the
reasonable royalty is less than the ex ante value of the technology (that is, excluding sunk costs) to the user as compared with
255
the best unpatented alternative. That condition is satisfied
even if ex ante competition is not taken into account at all, because in a contingent ex ante negotiation the user will not
agree to pay more than the value of the technology excluding
sunk costs, even if there is only one patented choice for the
standard. From a dynamic efficiency perspective (the incentive
to invent), a reasonable royalty must be greater than the marginal cost and less than the full social surplus. Again, the reasonable royalty determined in a contingent ex ante negotiation
will satisfy that criterion even if patented competition is ignored entirely.
As discussed above, to take ex ante competition into account in a negotiation model (that is to say, without driving the
royalty down to zero, as in the auction model), would shift the
bargaining power in favour of the user. But as we have noted,
there is no satisfactory theory of the optimal return to a patentee, and in the absence of such a model we cannot say
whether that shift would be optimal in theory.
Because of the absence of a good theory of the optimal return to a patentee, we took the return to a similarly situated
patentee to be the appropriate benchmark. The question then is
what counts as a similarly situated patentee? In general, competing patented technologies arise because different inventors

255. See supra Part II.B.
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256

are trying to solve the same problem. This is part of the patent race problem, which manifests itself partly in increased
costs of invention, as various parties seek to be first, but also in
increased competition and reduced profits within a class of
257
products. Because the problem is a general one, we might say
that the appropriate benchmark is competing patents outside
the standards context, such as Viagra and Cialis. If the return
to Viagra is in fact affected by competition from Cialis, and vice
versa, then if there is similar competition to develop technology
intended for a standard, the return to the successful patentee
should be similarly reduced to reflect that competition, or inventors racing to be part of a standard will receive a higher
payoff than inventors racing to be capture a non-standardized
market.
The other salient comparison is with an invention that becomes a de facto standard by virtue of being first to market. If
technology A captures the market, the difficulty of switching
means that the royalty that A can charge will not be reduced
even if equivalent technologies are subsequently developed. Put
another way, because of the nature of the market for a standard, ex post competition from equivalent products will not depress royalties in the same way as in a market without network
effects.
In our view, it is preferable to ignore the effect of ex ante
competition on price. While it is appealing to imagine ex ante
price competition (even contingent ex ante competition, as in
our model), price competition is not in fact a part of the process
258
of developing a standard. In our view, that is for the best.
Apart from concerns about antitrust violations if pricing were
to be discussed during the standard development process, the
technical task of developing a sound standard is difficult
enough as it is, which is why the engineers prefer to be able to

256. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry, 75 AM.
ECON. REV., 25, 29–30 (1985).
257. The patent race literature normally emphasizes costs, because the
usual model is one in which the inventors are competing to develop exactly the
same invention, leading to a winner-take-all race. More realistically, in many
cases the competing inventors will develop inventions which are patentably
distinct yet close substitutes. In such cases, the competition will raise costs, as
in the classic patent race, but will also depress profits.
258. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, PATENT
CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 60 (Keith
Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013) (“[F]ew SSOs have adopted policies
with regard to ex ante disclosure of licensing terms.”).
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do so based on purely technical considerations. Apart from
these practical considerations, there are theoretical objections
to allowing price competition in the standard setting process. It
might mean an inferior standard would be adopted. This would
be desirable only if the deadweight loss from increased adoption due to the higher price for the technically superior standard at a higher price more than outweighed the increased consumer surplus due to the technical superiority. Whether that is
true is an empirical question which depends on the particular
markets and the exact price reduction at issue. It would be impossible to assess with the requisite degree of certainty during
ex ante negotiations. For that reason, we think the current approach of focusing on the technical aspects of the standard is
sound.
Ignoring ex ante competition implies that the appropriate
comparison is with an invention that becomes a de facto standard. In our view, this is also appropriate because it avoids distorting the standards process. If a de facto standard was able to
charge a price unconstrained by the threat of a switch to a
competing standard, while a formal standard was so limited,
this would provide an incentive to avoid formal standards, even
when formal standards might be more efficient and provide for
earlier standardization.
In summary, while there is considerable intuitive appeal to
imagining that royalties would be constrained by ex ante competition, there is no reason to believe that constrained royalties
would be superior in terms of either static or dynamic efficiency. The question should therefore turn on what is the appropriate real-world benchmark for a patent that has been selected to be included in a standard. In our view, the appropriate
benchmark is the situation of a patentee with a de facto standard which emerged in the absence of competition, because this
benchmark ensures that the choice between a de facto standard
and a formal standard is financially neutral.

